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ABSTRACT
THE INVISIBLE CRISIS:
FRAMING THE REMEDIATION OF MILWAUKEE’S LEAD LATERALS

by
Isabella Rieke
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2018
Under the supervision of Professor Ryan Holifield
When Milwaukee’s municipal water system was developed in 1874, one-half-inch lead
pipes were used to convey water from the mains in the street to a customer’s home; the City has
since acknowledged that nearly 100,000 such lead pipes are still in use today, a revelation which
has opened for debate whether or not these pipes pose a galvanizing public health risk with farreaching policy and infrastructure implications. This study explores the community response to
Milwaukee’s lead laterals through the efforts of the Freshwater for Life Action Coalition
(FLAC). How do Milwaukeeans understand the risks posed by the lead laterals? In what ways
do they believe themselves, the City of Milwaukee, or other actors to be responsible for
remediating these risks? How has FLAC framed the issue to energize their local social activist
movement? Even more so, is there some about lead, specifically, which makes it difficult to
organize a movement? How does lead itself play a role in understanding risk and responsibility
in this social movement? By exploring the factors that contribute to how Milwaukeeans
understand the risks posed by the lead pipes, this study seeks to understand in what ways — if at
all — they consider themselves and the City to be responsible for remediating those risks.
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1 - INTRODUCTION
Shortly after I moved to Milwaukee in August of 2016, a friend and I were listening to a
radio piece covering the ongoing lead poisoning and lack of safe, drinkable water in Flint,
Michigan. “People aren’t even talking about it, but we have those here too, you know,” she said
to me. She was referring to Milwaukee’s lead laterals, the subterranean pipes that connect each
property to the city’s water mains. A careful search of the Milwaukee Water Works’ website
confirmed not only that Milwaukee had lead laterals, but also that they were connected to over
70,000 residences throughout the city — including my own. Over the next year and a half, I
developed a strange, uneasy relationship with my tap: although I knew my trusty water filter
pitcher was not lead-certified, I continued to drink from it on a daily basis. I tried to flush the tap
for at least three minutes each morning, as the City’s website instructed, but if I was in a rush (as
I often was) I was willing to settle for a minute, at best. Each morning, I boiled tap water to
make myself coffee, nervously brushing away the thought that boiling water can increase lead
concentration. In my home, I only drank filtered water, but I refilled my water bottle at bubblers
throughout the day, and warily drank tap water when it was served to me in restaurants. I spoke
often with others about my research, explaining the ubiquity of lead laterals even as I was
changing precious little about my own daily behaviors. It was only in recent months that I
upgraded to a lead-certified water filter, after over a year of researching Milwaukee’s lead
laterals and the activists who were trying to have them replaced. Although I knew — better than
most — the risks associated with lead laterals, my pipes were not keeping me up at night, nor
were they even compelling me to change my routines. So what, exactly, was going on here?
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This is precisely the conundrum faced by a group of local organizers dedicated to the
remediation of Milwaukee’s lead laterals; although the specter of risk looms large, it seems to be
just that — spectral, and not quite compelling enough for Milwaukee residents to choose to take
on the mental, emotional and financial burdens required to mitigate the risks for themselves and
their family. Although I might have been wary of my tap’s potentially harmful effects, the risk
seemed so far away, so easy to ignore, that I was willing to live with my own negotiated
discomfort. My water never made me feel sick, and I was never put off by its taste, color or
smell; nothing had changed about my objectively safe, drinkable water, except for the revelation
that it was potentially, unmeasurably dangerous. Further, no one was going to mitigate this
indiscernible risk for me — the government had no plans to replace the pipes, and my landlord
had no interest in assuming the massive costs. If I took seriously the risks my taps posed, I
would need to take unilateral steps to protect myself.
I had enough on my plate. I put it out of my mind.
•

•

•

In 2015, tests revealed lead levels of more than 100 parts per billion — nearly seven
times the federal safety level — in 24 of Wisconsin’s 72 public county water systems (Schmidt
& Hall 2016a). Among other events, these test results have compelled the City of Milwaukee to
acknowledge that more than 70,000 such lead pipes are still in use today, and have opened for
debate whether or not these pipes pose a galvanizing public health risk with far-reaching policy
and infrastructure implications. The driving force behind this debate is Robert Miranda, the lead
organizer of the Freshwater for Life Action Coalition, or FLAC. Miranda and his group have
spent the last three years organizing and lobbying for government action, demanding full
removal of the lead service lines at no cost to homeowners. This study is drawn from over a year
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and a half of qualitative research into the group’s efforts, methods, victories and challenges.
What initially began as an opportunity to follow an emergent social movement spearheaded by
community organizers quickly morphed into something more complex, as the uniqueness of the
group’s efforts — and more importantly, the uniqueness of their obstacles — became clear.
For FLAC, one of the major obstacles has been deciding how best to communicate the
risks of lead contamination in a way that mobilizes public and political support. This is a central
question in social movement theory, which is often addressed using the language of “collectiveaction frames,” discourses employed by social movements to legitimate and motivate activism
(Benford & Snow 1992). These frames articulate values, beliefs, concerns and goals, making
sense of events in such a way as to highlight collective identity and motivate collective action.
These frames can serve several different tasks (see Table 1): diagnostic frames identify a
problem and attribute blame; prognostic frames suggest solutions for the problem; and
motivational frames provide a rationale for activism.
At its core, this study has two very simple research questions: what collective-action
framings has FLAC employed, and what challenges have they faced? To that end, I provide an
exploration of the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framings the group employed and
some of the hurdles they faced. In part, I do this by asking what might be gleaned from where
the group’s framings have been successful versus where it has faced opposition or been forced to
adapt.
In response to the first question, this thesis argues that four characteristic framings were
most routinely employed by FLAC activists over a period of two years, including that the City of
Milwaukee is untrustworthy and more concerned with protecting its own interests than with
remediating the lead laterals (section 5.1); that the community is insufficiently aware of the issue
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(section 5.2); segregation in Milwaukee produces uneven effects and differential political
opportunity structures (section 5.3); and that the City’s current responses have been insufficient
(section 5.4). As I trace the major components of the framing, I answer the second research
question above with two arguments. The first is that the subdued response to FLAC’s
motivational framing, or their calls for activism, stems in part from a tension in the group’s
prognostic framings or proposed solutions, to which municipal and organizational actors have
responded by focusing their efforts on short-term mitigation strategies — such as distributing
filters to residents — rather than long term proposals for full remediation. If effectively
managed and equitably distributed, these short-term solutions can be a tremendous boon for
residents, nearly eliminating the risks posed by lead laterals. However, this also means that a
bifurcated response may have the effect of managing the crisis in the short term, relieving the
political pressure for elected officials to answer FLAC’s demands with a comprehensive solution
for a problem which has been managed (nearly) out of existence.
In addition to the elements of FLAC’s framings, this study explores some of the
unanticipated findings that have proven to be far more complex than the unassuming research
questions would suggest, demonstrating the precariousness of FLAC’s efforts. First and
foremost, the findings in this study show that one of the group’s most significant challenges is
the increased devolution of responsibility for managing the risks of contaminated pipes, which
stems in large part from the short-term solutions referenced above. These proposed interim
solutions shift the onus for mitigation strategies from government officials to dutiful residents,
who are held increasingly accountable for securing their own health outcomes. As noted, when
responsibility for mitigating the risk of lead exposure is increasingly shifted to individual
residents, attention and resources are primarily directed to quick fix, “band-aid” solutions that
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mitigate — rather than remove — the risks associated with lead pipes. This has the dual effect
of not only shifting emphasis away from comprehensive municipal solutions for full removal, but
also minimizing the magnitude of the public health crisis, thereby minimizing the need for such
long-term solutions. Additionally, not every Milwaukee resident has the ability to bear the
mental, emotional and financial burdens of the proposed short-term solutions; if residents are
made increasingly responsible for their own short-term solutions, safety becomes not only a
choice but a luxury, and one that not every resident can afford.
As my own personal experience with lead laterals demonstrates, this shifting of
responsibility is further complicated by the invisibility and unknowability of lead and its
attendant risks, which play a critical role in residents’ decisions to adopt or ignore the mitigation
strategies presented to them. Both lead and the networks — social, political, economic,
historical — within which Milwaukee’s lead laterals are contained play roles in conditioning and
shaping the political opportunity structure. I therefore argue, as an additional part of my answer
to the second research question, that it is not simply the distinctiveness of lead, but instead the
distinctiveness of how lead is situated in Milwaukee, that has played a tremendous role in
shaping public and political perceptions and FLAC’s remediation efforts. For this reason,
although comparisons to Flint might seem intuitive, the two cases are not entirely analogous.
This thesis attempts to make clear not only the difficulties of organizing around urban lead, but
in organizing around Milwaukee’s urban lead, in particular.
What, then, are the problems that arise when lead risk is invisible? For organizers, the
first hurdle has been convincing residents that the risk is real, widespread and dangerous.
Because the effects of lead poisoning are often associated with or disguised by other factors, this
is no small feat. The majority of scientific study has focused on the effects of lead on children,
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and scientific consensus on the long term-effects of continuous low levels of lead on adults
remains relatively elusive. However, studies have shown that lead poisoning can affect behavior,
intelligence and fertility, and can lead to heart disease, high blood pressure and kidney disease
(CDC 2017, Lanphear et al. 2018, Navas-Acien et al. 2007). The majority of these lead-related
health outcomes commonly associated with genetics or ‘lifestyle choices,’ masking their
connection to lead exposure. Further, many of the most effective mitigation strategies which
could prevent these health outcomes from ever becoming ‘visible’ are attributable to wealth and
Whiteness, meaning the effects of lead poisoning are unevenly distributed across the population.
Lead exposure is closely tied to the age and quality of housing stock, the ability of some
property owners to replace old lead pipes and abate any lead paint can reduce their lead exposure
to undetectable levels. The effects of lead exposure can also be mitigated through a ‘healthy’
diet; healthiness is here represented by a very particular and structured kind of diet, as the diets
that are known to mitigate lead effects are low in sugar, with no snacks or processed foods.
Snack foods and sweets frequently sold and consumed in low-income non-White neighborhoods,
in particular those imported from Mexico, have been found to be packaged with leadcontaminated wrappers (Fuortes & Bauer 2000). This means that, even if all Milwaukeeans
suffered equal rates of lead exposure, non-White residents and any Milwaukeeans living with
food insecurity would not have access to a fundamental means of mitigating its effects, making
the embodied effects of the same exposure invisible for some and hazardous for others. For
organizers, this invisibility is presents a major obstacle; it requires that FLAC not only persuade
Milwaukee residents that their seemingly clean, drinkable water is dangerous, but also that they
illuminate what may have contributed to a (misplaced) sense of security in the water’s patent
drinkability. Specifically, the group must highlight the role of residents’ inadvertent behaviors
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and socioeconomic status in unevenly mitigating risk, as contrasted to the government's
presumed municipal ability to uniformly eradicate any hazards.
There are inevitable limitations with a study of this nature, which engages with a current
and evolving movement that changes with every passing day. It is well beyond the scope of this
paper to map all of the framings employed by activists, or all of the nuanced ways in which they
are attempting to respond to risk. Instead, I have analyzed the framings most routinely employed
by organizers over the course of my research, which means that there is a substantial amount of
FLAC’s work which remains unexamined. However, I have represented as faithfully as possible
the efforts of the group as they were explained to me, using an inductive coding method to infer
connections between statements made by organizers and activists. A further limitation of this
study is the lack of analysis of City counter-frames, which may seem to suggest that half of the
story has been omitted. To this, I can say that my research was focused on FLAC, and their
efforts to organize. Any analysis of the City, therefore, is through their eyes as it was applied in
their framings. Although analysis of the City’s counter framings might add context to the
language FLAC employed, I do not think my findings suffer from the exclusion; this paper does
not attempt to paint a comprehensive picture of the issue, as seen from all sides — rather, it is an
attempt to track the idiosyncratic victories and obstacles of one local social movement.
The chapter that follows situates this case study within the existing literature on social
movement theory and collective-action frames, and argues that these theoretical bodies of work
are insufficient to explain the unique challenges faced by Milwaukee organizers. Instead, this
thesis argues that we must draw upon other bodies of literature, such as those examining the role
of non-humans, to more thoroughly consider the unique challenges of FLAC’s activism. A
subsequent background chapter explores the formation of FLAC and the current crisis of lead
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laterals, and traces the development of Milwaukee’s water system and its history of tracking the
impacts of lead pipes, as well as the city’s vested interest in water technology and resiliency.
The methodology chapter explains the methods used to collect and analyze data, as well as some
of the limitations of the methods employed. Lastly, the data collected from participant
observation, in-depth interviews and analysis of survey data will be used to analyze FLAC’s
efforts to organize around Milwaukee’s lead laterals, and to parse the uniqueness of the varied
accomplishments and hurdles the group has encountered.
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2 - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This thesis builds on the existing literature on social movement theory and “collectiveaction frames” (Benford 1993, Benford and Snow, 2000, Snow 2013) to explore how FLAC has
employed certain “frames” (Goffman 1974) to shape their mobilization efforts. In this section, I
explore existing research on social movements, with a specific focus on how we might
differently examine local social movements (LSMs) as distinct from larger, more formalized
social movement organizations (SMOs). Because of the similarities between this case study and
other environmental justice movements, I rely on examples from environmental justice (EJ)
literature that demonstrate how place and scale are both defined and leveraged in the framings
employed by LSMs to produce meaning and motivate action (Kurtz 2003, Martin 2003). I also
turn to scholarship on the agency of non-humans (Latour 2005, Robbins 2007) to further expand
our understanding of who — or what — is involved in the development and deployment of
certain frames, a factor which I contend has been largely overlooked by theories of social
movements and frame construction. In this capacity, I ask whether there is something about
urban lead which makes it a uniquely difficult focus for social movement actors, with reference
to the history of urban lead organizing and the recent examples of SMO activity in Flint,
Michigan.

2.1 Social Movements and Local Social Movements (LSMs)
Social movements can be thought of as sustained contentious collective actions to further
certain social or political goals (Tarrow 1998). The scholarship on social movements has
developed from initially viewing these movements as random, somewhat episodic bursts of
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collective behavior, wherein feelings of marginalization and alienation were seen to motivate
participation in social movements (see McPhail 1991). Although this theory of collective
behavior has been repudiated, this branch of scholarship held that collective behavior events are
incited by ‘anomie’ or social disorganization, an understanding of social movements as an
inevitable class conflict or social breakdown. More recent scholarship has shown that social
movements are in fact more likely to be comprised by less marginalized, more socially integrated
members of society, emphasizing the role of rational choice and effectively reclaiming protest as
a normal and organized activity of which rational individuals can choose to partake (Olson
1965). This position inspired a new wave of social movement scholarship focused on resource
mobilization and political opportunity (Gamson 1980, Jenkins 1983, Tilly 1978). These theories
emphasize the importance not only of resource mobilization — money, people, networks,
legitimacy — but also of formalized social movement organizations (SMOs) to accrue, wield and
deploy these resources in certain conducive political contexts. It might be argued that aspects of
resource mobilization theory go too far in overcorrecting for prior social movement theory by
assigning such a degree of organization and rationality — the introduction of concepts such as
SMOs and other formalized groups — that social movements begin to appear guided by
economic and entrepreneurial aims, competitively ‘branding’ their framing to appeal to potential
participants (Tarrow 1998). A political process model, by contrast, sees SMOs as neither
irrational mobs nor savvy entrepreneurial outfits; rather, they are a link between people and their
political institutions, exploiting political ‘openings’ or opportunities for social actors to who lack
regular access to power and institutions to become involved in collective action (Tarrow 1998).
Following the social movements of the 1960s, a set of “new” social movement theory has drawn
from a European tradition, emphasizing the ways in which modern, post-industrial social
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movements are fundamentally different from social movements of the past (Habermas 1981).
The group of theorists focus in particular on how these “new” social movements differ in their
goals, focusing on the evolution of the public sphere and issues of human rights.
The emphasis routinely given to the importance of resource mobilization and political
opportunity in motivating collective action tends to reinforce the study of large or even national
social movements as the primary focus of social movement scholarship, given their ability to
access, accumulate and mobilize resources in order to capitalize upon political opportunities.
However, many social movements are neither large nor national, and even organizations as
localized as neighborhood groups may be considered social movements in that they bring
together residents with a variety of resources to address an array of political, social and economic
issues, albeit at the neighborhood level. In this paper, I apply the term “local social movements”
(LSMs) to refer to informal organizations with ad hoc structures and limited resources that
operate within a focused or limited spatiality, varying in scale from block-level to city-wide
organizations. Although they have less formalized organizational structures than SMOs, LSMs
still work to demand change from formalized governance structures; they simply do so by
defining priorities and politics at a scale other than that of the local government (Martin 2003).
This complex negotiation of scale situates the localized grievances of an LSM in discourse with
the broader scale of local (community, municipal, county) government, by both highlighting
locally specific issues and injustices and relating them to the broader spatial and political context
within which they occur.
For LSMs, windows of political opportunity may be remarkably idiosyncratic based upon
the scale at which they occur and the political structures and regimes within which they arise.
Even LSMs working within the same political context may have differentiated access to
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resources and political opportunities. Ferman (1996) examines the role of neighborhood
mobilization in urban regimes by exploring the differential responses to neighborhood
mobilization in a comparison study between Pittsburgh and Chicago; her assessment of regime
theory is an instructive step towards integrating research on neighborhood organization into our
conception of urban politics, and how we might differently examine the opportunities presented
by political opening not only between cities, but amongst neighborhoods within a given city.
Political ‘openings’ can portend widely divergent social, political, and economic possibilities for
different communities, a unevenness that LSMs must contend with but may also harness to their
advantage.

2.2 Frame construction in social movements
Framing, or the “schemata of interpretation,” (Goffman 1974) is useful in understanding
how social movements define and legitimate their activism through the development of meaning
and vocabularies. Framing theories fill a gap in the conventional resource mobilization and
political opportunity literature by describing how social movement actor interpret events and
situations such that they become meaningful and, more importantly, guide action. A central
focus of traditional social movement theory is to understand what compels people to participate;
as previously noted, this scholarship traditionally calls our attention to the more structural
elements of social movements, such as resource mobilization and political opportunity. Through
these more structuralist lenses, frames might be considered “resources,” which SMOs can
mobilize to motivate participation in a particular social action (Benford & Snow 2000).
However, this emphasis on resource mobilization and political opportunity largely presupposes
the existence of grievances, as resources to be mined, and then asks what additional resources —
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Table 1 - Framing Tasks
Diagnostic frames

Prognostic frames

Motivational frames

Discursive strategies used to identify a
problem and attribute blame and
causality, articulating victims and
perpetrators.

Interpretative packages used to develop
strategies for action, propose solutions
for an undesirable situation.

Interpretive packages used to garner a
public response, with direct suggestions
for collective action, and vocabularies
of motive as rationale for engaging in
such activity.

Who or what is the problem?
How is it defined?

How should we solve the problem?

Why should I get involved?
How can I?

of which frames may be one — or opportunities are required to motivate participation. Although
scholarship on framing similarly focuses on what compels participation, it does not assume that
grievances exist a priori, but rather that “meaning work” must be undertaken by movement
actors to produce mobilizing ideas that necessitate social action (Benford & Snow 2000, Kurtz
2003). In this sense, framing may be considered a central dynamic that propels social
movements, motivating action by simplifying an existing and complex reality into more parsable
component parts, framing both a problem and its necessary response (Benford & Snow 2000).
Inherent in this conception is the idea that framing is performed by some for others, “an
active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality
construction” whereby elites within the SMO are engaged in the evolving process of “the
production and maintenance of meaning” through the development of discourses, or frames
(Benford & Snow 2000, 614). Using Snow and Benford’s (1992) conceptual heuristic of core
framing tasks, collective-action frames can be broken into three primary elements: diagnostic
framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing. Diagnostic frames (see Table 1) are
used to articulate not only the central grievance(s) of the movement but also the source and cause
of such a grievance. Diagnostic frames are similarly used to attribute blame and responsibility,
to which prognostic frames may respond by advocating solutions for the diagnosed problem.
13

Motivational frames not only define the community that is affected, but provide vocabularies of
motive (Benford 1993) — severity, urgency, efficacy, propriety — to signify compelling reasons
for individuals to take action. Taken together, this framing fostered by social movement actors
motivates collective action through the articulation of shared social identities, and the seemingly
kindred ways in which individuals make sense of events (Goffman, 1974).

2.3 Place and scale in frame construction
Although it is critically important to ask who is developing collective action frames and
what they are designed to communicate, it is further helpful to understand how the geographic
dimensions of that which is being framed dictates or in some way contributes to the ultimate
framing. Martin extends social movement theory to explore the specific role of place-based
identity in motivating activism through collective-action frames, or what she terms “placeframes” (Martin, 2003). In this, the specificity of the place-frame helps to define collective
identity by “situating activism in place,” drawing upon common experiences that are spatially
related to define “the scope and scale of the shared neighborhood of collective concern” (Martin,
2003). Martin’s study of place-frames is helpful to our discussion of LSMs in that it examines
the discursive role of community organizations in justifying both local activism and local
identity, and how LSMs articulate neighborhood interests as ‘universal,’ superseding individual
(divergent) identities and compelling collective action. By employing a place-frame at the
neighborhood scale, organizations can construct a specific, local spatiality as a legitimate space
for political action, justifying and reinforcing mobilization at a scale smaller than the larger
context within which the neighborhood exists. These place-based frames allow us to more
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effectively explore how a specific spatiality can be leveraged in the framing of social activism at
a variety of scales.
These discourses of scale are frequently seen in local environmental justice (EJ)
movements, in that they often employ what Buell (2001) refers to as a “politics of elasticity,”
relating the localized impacts of environmental injustices to the broader spatial and political
factors which produce and maintain these injustices. Small, local EJ movements are often
defined by the tension inherent in articulating these spatial ambiguity between the local scale at
which residents experience the negative embodied effects of pollution, and the more spatially
diffuse scales at which environmental injustices are both produced and experienced (Harvey,
1996; Pulido, 1996). Therefore, local EJ movements must rely on these discourses of scale,
simultaneously calling attention to the idiosyncrasies of their locally specific grievance while
remaining in conversation with the broader sociopolitical implications of EJ writ large.
Kurtz’s (2003) case study explores the role of scale in LSM framing, examining a
proposed chemical facility in Louisiana through the lens of scale- and counter-scale frames.
Scale frames, in Kurtz’s analysis, are both collective-action frames and discursive practices
which “construct meaningful (and actionable) linkages between the scale at which a social
problem is experienced and the scale(s) at which it could be politically addressed or resolved”
(Kurtz, 2003 p 894). These framings — of which there are multiple — allow for representations
of the controversy at different “idioms of scale,” which may be successively used and reframed
to target not only different potential solutions, but also different (inclusive) coalitions of
activists. The politics of scale play a particularly critical role in the politics of environmental
justice, which as previously noted must simultaneously speak to broad — even global — issues
of environmental justice, while remaining rooted in the locally specific EJ issue. Kurtz finds that
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locally specific EJ movements are utile in rooting the somewhat conceptual notions of
environmental justice, which “cannot be formulated in the abstract, but must be understood with
reference to the discursive strategies and material conditions of grassroots struggle” to
accommodate lived (and localized) experiences and conceptions of environmental injustice.
(Kurtz 2003, p 912). Following Kurtz’s analysis, we must question how pre-existing geographic
scales serve to articulate the lived experiences of those affected by environmental injustice,
which is not always bounded by the same politically-articulated boundaries of space we
colloquially understand. Scale frames can therefore benefit by incorporating more nuanced
expressions of space — shifting, overlapping — explicitly leveraging ambiguity to their spatially
specific political advantage without capitulating to the complex spatial ambiguity of
environmental injustice.
As Martin and Kurtz ably demonstrate, the place that is being framed — and the scale at
which that place is articulated — make a difference to the frame that is ultimately employed.
This literature on social movement frames sheds much light on how LSMs can motivate action,
by employing place- and scale-frames which allow LSMs to define smaller spatial scales as
legitimate spheres of action, and to link the multiple scales at which the effects of a spatially
diffuse problem may be experienced. Due in no small part to the spatially diffuse nature of
environmental injustices, literature on environmental social movements goes further to engage
with that which is being framed — the object, rather than the subject — than does traditional
social movement theory. However, it does not yet go far enough in exploring the role of the nonhuman objects, issues and spatialities around which the LSM seeks to “produce meaning,” and
how the specificity of these elements may contribute significantly to their ultimate framing. This
kind of a shift in focus would raise different questions, asking us to move from examining only
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the agency and resources of the subject — social movements — to incorporating the same
agential powers of the object — in this case of this thesis, lead laterals. I contend that the work
of Martin and Kurtz asks us to consider a possible gap in the existing literature on framing and
social movements: that it does not yet take seriously enough the role of non-humans in shaping
collective-action frames and productions of meaning. To this end, we must make room in our
analysis to examine the agency and ability of actors beyond the (human) SMO elites to not only
co-frame social issues, but to inhibit or enhance the effectiveness of collective-action frames.

2.4 Recognizing the role of non-humans in risk construction
Engaging with the specificity of that which is being framed — in this case, Milwaukee’s
lead laterals — allows us to explore the agency of non-humans in shaping the resultant framings
employed by social movement actors. Here, I employ the term “agency” in a more expansive
sense than the traditional definition of agency, which is to say more than simply the capacity of
humans (subjects) to make choices to act at will and affect others (objects). Employing an
expanded definition allows us to disrupt the subject-object dichotomy and account for differing
forms of agency, such as the ability of non-humans to strive to adapt and alter their surroundings,
for which social movement actors must (perhaps unwittingly) account. Actor Network Theory
(ANT) offers new ways of recognizing the agency of non-humans as an essential part of the
relationship between society and the natural world (Latour 2005). Through ANT, agency is
understood to be interactional, operating relationally between different actants — a term used to
refer to both humans and non-humans — in a manner that defies subject-object distinctions and
deemphasizes the role of intentionality. Taken this way, non-humans — animals, plants,
weather, lead laterals — can be understood to exercise agency by creating order and disorder,
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altering their surroundings both with or without intentionality. An expanded notion of agency
neither dismisses nor diminishes the significance of human agency, but instead situates it within
a wider network of actants, wherein humans are participants rather than proprietors. Through
this lens, we may see the unique properties of lead laterals as more than simply anecdotal or
coincidental, but rather as critical and agential in altering their surroundings, including the
behavior of Milwaukee residents and social movement actants.
In much the same way that ANT instructs us to look more closely at the network of
forces and objects which together produce what might appear to be free will or agency, Michel
Foucault’s notion of governmentality helps to articulate the relational power networks within
which the self-governing citizen is made to be responsible for their risk calculations. Through
this lens, the simple hegemon of the state is not solely responsible for enforcing the actions of
citizens. Rather, individual subjects come to be responsible for animating themselves, driven by
a governmentality which is internally motivated. Rutland and Aylett (2008) combine ANT with
literature on governmentality, using the example of local environmental governance (LEG) in
Portland, Oregon to explore how the local state enlisted the “self-governing capacities of its
residents” to achieve its goals (Rutland & Aylett 2008, 627) and — borrowing from ANT — the
‘translations’ it employed to do so. Their seamless synthesis of these two frameworks produces
a compelling argument that these two concepts can be used together to more fully understand the
dynamics of urban governance, as political priorities are produced through a variety of actants
that guide and construct meaning. For the purposes of this thesis, these two perspectives are
similarly helpful in understanding the dynamics of a local urban social movement focused on
lead contamination.
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Robbins (2007) employs ANT among other theories to examine the complex relationship
between lawns and their suburban American ‘subjects’ (whom he refers to as “lawn people”),
asking what causes suburban residents to avidly treat their lawns with chemicals, and how we
can make sense of their decision to do so, given the anxiety such chemicals cause them.
Following the logic of ANT, Robbins does not assume that “lawn people” choose to apply
chemicals and scrupulously maintain their lawns simply because it is their desire to do so, but
rather works to reveal the deeply embodied conditions, networks and actants which drive these
decisions. By acknowledging the networks within which individuals make decisions, especially
risky ones, Robbins helps to locate some of the more surprising factors driving people to submit
to — and willingly produce — environments at odds with their own health outcomes. It is worth
asking in what ways “lawn people” are similar to what we might call “lead lateral people,” or the
residents that knowingly live with lead laterals; they are both embedded within actor-networks
which enable them to live with and re-produce a certain amount of risk or anxiety, in spite of
their awareness of the risks. What networks exist that make certain ‘risky’ conditions of the
urban environment seem necessary or inevitable, and by what logic might “lead lateral people”
submit to these conditions, in spite of the anxiety they cause? What properties of the lead
laterals, in particular, might be contributing residents’ ability to live with these negotiated risks?
By situating risk and responsibility within the larger networks that produce them, we can
interrogate the complex factors that together influence residents’ options and obligations in ways
that might motivate them to — or dissuade them from — action.
•

•

•

It is important to understand not only the theories that guide the study of social
movements, but the particular resources those movements — and, in particular, local movements
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— might use to advance their efforts. For LSMs, framing is a resource of paramount
importance, given that these small movements often have a dearth of other resources to leverage
and limited political opportunities. As this review has demonstrated, framings employed by
smaller movements often benefit from nuanced understandings of place and scale, which allow
them to articulate their specific, localized grievances in conversation with more spatially and
politically diffuse concepts. Therefore, this current study seeks to examine how a local social
movement leverages both place and scale in framing the issue of lead contamination, and further
asks what are the limitations of such framings? Although place and scale are important to social
movement framing, we also need to understand how non-humans shape and condition these
frames; urban lead contamination provides a particularly illuminating case to explore how the
properties of non-humans can shape the dynamics of social movements. Although many cities
have recently experienced local social movements in response to lead contamination of urban
water, including Flint, Michigan, this thesis contends that the dynamics at play in Milwaukee are
distinct, and worthy of investigation for what they reveal about non-humans and social
movement framing dynamics.
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3 - BACKGROUND
In order to better understand the dynamics of the current case study it is helpful to situate
it within the context of urban lead, and social movements that have organized around its
remediation. First, a brief examination of the history of lead regulation helps to reveal the
differentiated approaches and the devolution of responsibility for mitigation strategies from the
federal government to the individual, a trend which parallels the larger shift towards neoliberal
governance, and which has significant implications for the activists in the current Milwaukee
case. This section also briefly explores the LSM dynamics in Flint, Michigan, and how that
city’s experience with urban lead contamination has served as a resource for other mobilization
efforts. I then turn to Milwaukee — the following sections are devoted to the history of the
city’s water supply, including the development of the city’s water works, its experience with
cryptosporidium parvum in the 1990s and the subsequent efforts to reinvent the city as the
‘Freshwater Capital of the World.’ The following sections examine the leniency of the EPA
requirements for testing and managing urban lead levels, and how the current case of lead
contamination and the revelations of Milwaukee’s lead laterals came to light.
Before exploring the emergence of FLAC, I look briefly at Milwaukee’s history of lead
abatement programs, including its lead paint abatement program. Because lead laterals are not
the only source of lead exposure, and the effects of lead exposure are compounded by other
factors, this section helps to contextualize the risk factors — such as housing, and Milwaukee’s
patterns of housing segregation and disinvestment — that make certain areas of the city ‘riskier’
for lead contamination than others. Although this may seem to be tangential to the current case
of lead contamination in water, it is central to the dynamics of FLAC’s framings, which seek to
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highlight both the universal risk of the lead laterals and the differentiated risks of lead
contamination. The section concludes with a brief history of the group’s development, as well as
a discussion of the recent political scandals which have lent more visibility and credibility to the
FLAC’s efforts.

3.1 Organizing around urban lead
Lead poisoning has long been a public health concern, and federal regulations that have
dramatically reduced exposure to lead in the United States in the 20th century should be lauded.
However, an examination of the history of regulatory changes and organizing efforts around
urban lead exposure reveals differential responses to the three primary forms of risk: the
occupational risks posed to workers in lead-using industries; risks posed specifically to children,
which have drawn the most medical and political attention; and environmental risks, which are
seen as “universal” risks that have indiscriminate effects upon the population (Warren 2001).
Although scholarship has been dedicated to distinguishing between the social conditions that
drove responses to these three modes of exposure, little attention has been paid to the agential
role of lead in shaping such differentiated responses.
The majority of early regulation efforts focused on occupational hazards, demanding
increased federal oversight of producers and employers to limit severe exposure in the workplace
(Warren 2001, Rabin 2008). As Warren’s (2001) comprehensive review of lead reform makes
clear, these early efforts were focused on the clinical symptoms that resulted from severe levels
of lead poisoning. As medical research has advanced, regulation has instead been tied to
quantitative measures — such as lead blood levels — rather than observable symptoms,
reflecting a cultural aversion not only to the most dire consequences of lead exposure, but to any
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form of preventable risk (Warren 2001). This shift meant that regulation no longer targeted the
most problematic and large-scale sources of lead exposure, such as the paint and gasoline
industries, but was suddenly focused at the individual level of each child’s lead levels. Federal
funding has supported local governments and health care providers in assuming a large portion
of responsibility for this more granular kind of regulation through subsidized lead abatement
programs and childhood testing protocols, allowing them to assist families in identifying and
remedying individual cases of lead exposure (Rabin 2008). However, in an increasingly
neoliberal context of decreased federal funding and devolved responsibility, families and
individuals are expected to assume a far greater onus for averting these ‘preventable’ risks.
Following Nikolas Rose (2001), we may see this a sort of pre-sickness, whereby individuals who
are neither observably nor experientially ‘sick’ are nonetheless enjoined to adopt certain habits
and precautions under the auspices of responsibility, in attempts to prevent an illness that may
never arrive.
This is further complicated by the inaccessibility of the technical knowledge which
undergirds the definition of ‘risk’ as defined by policy and scientists. As Ottinger (2018) tells us,
science — by nature of its political authority and inherent value-system — limits the ability of
non-scientists to participate in debate or knowledge construction. This is particularly dangerous
in cases pertaining to EJ issues, as the full scope of possible hazards can be obscured by the
technical language and those most directly affected by environmental injustices — non-scientists
— are unable to participate in decision making.
Lead in drinking water has proven to be a particularly complex problem to identify and
eradicate. Although leaded gasoline was all but eliminated by 1988, and a 1978 ban prohibited
use of lead as an additive in paint (Schmidt & Hall, 2016b), plumbing, one of the most common
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sources of lead exposure, was not explicitly outlawed until 1986. It was not until 1991 that the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Lead & Copper Rule (LCR) moved to regulate
exposure to lead in drinking water (U.S. EPA, 1991). Because lead pipes were widely used in
the development of urban water systems through the United States in the late 1800s, regulation
of lead levels in a city’s drinking water is a geographically intractable problem, requiring the
management or replacement of a subterranean network of city-owned service lines combined
with property-owned lines leading to myriad commercial and residential properties. Further, any
partial updates or replacements made to the lines may in fact result in higher levels of lead
contamination, due to the disturbance caused to the corrosion during replacement (Trueman,
Camara & Gagnon, 2016), a distinct phenomenon which has implications for the efficacy of
frames which seek to address possible remediation.
It is impossible to explore the unique difficulties of organizing around urban lead without
consulting the example of Flint, Michigan, a widely publicized and politicized example of urban
lead poisoning. As Pulido (2016) notes, the case of Flint is significant not least because of the
horrors inflicted upon Flint residents, but because it made visible the larger structural context
within which ‘isolated’ incidents occur, which is so often invisible in instances of environmental
racism. The city decided in 2014 to switch its water supply to the Flint River as a cost-cutting
measure, a water source so polluted and corrosive that it caused car parts in GM’s Flint factory to
rust, to say nothing of the effects on Flint’s human residents (Pulido 2016). Scholarship on the
environmental racism experienced in Flint has done much to critically reveal the ways in which
this incident is not incidental, but is in fact intrinsic to modern systems of governance (Pulido
2016, Ranganathan 2016). Following these analyses, racist intent is seen as an important driver
but not the sole motivator; rather, these studies call our attention to racial liberalism and global
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capitalism, the context within which black and brown bodies have been systematically devalued
to create a “landscape of differential value which can be harnessed in diverse ways to facilitate
the accumulation of more power and profit” (Pulido 2016, 1). Social movement efforts to
remediate and draw attention to Flint’s lead poisoning have similarly focused on the social
conditions and racialized logic which facilitated the city’s decision to baldly prioritize the import
of delivering water within a suitable budget over the potential, and as yet unproven, long term
health effects for the individual. For activists outside of the city, Flint has served as a
galvanizing instance of environmental racism and municipal depravity, a resource that has been
mobilized by other LSMs, including the Milwaukee activists.

3.2 Developing Milwaukee’s water system
Milwaukee established a Board of Water Commissioners in 1871, nearly three decades
after the city’s incorporation. The public had long been clamoring for a municipal water system;
the population of the city already exceeded 100,000 and the human demands on the water supply
were significant – and galling. Absent a system for disposal, Milwaukee households disposed of
their own garbage by leaving it the streets; the substantial runoff polluted the city’s groundwater
to such an extent that “liquid filth” routinely came out of the water pumps (Leavitt 1996, FossMollan 2001). In the early stages of the development of the water system, water was hardly
considered to be a public right, a distinction which was reflected in both the plans for
development and the techniques of funding. The city began laying a distribution system of large
water mains, to which pipes were laid and linked up to deliver water according to a
“subscription” system, whereby neighborhoods (sometimes no more than one or more city
blocks) would petition their ward supervisor or alderman for the water pipes, and would then set
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Figure 1 — Diagram of water system and lead laterals
Source: City of Milwaukee

about raising the funds to pay for their installation (Foss-Mollan 2001). Unsurprisingly, this
system privileged both well-financed and well-connected Milwaukeeans who had the ear of their
alderman, prioritizing the expansion of the water system in more desirable areas of the city.
Though “subscriptions” were eventually superseded by a development plan driven more by
efficiency than by selectivity, the legacy of subscriptions did not entirely disappear; certain
wards on Milwaukee’s South side waited up to thirty years longer than other wards for city
services (Foss-Mollan 2001).
When development began on Milwaukee’s municipal water system in 1874, one-halfinch lead pipes were used for the service lines (also known as laterals) to convey water from the
mains in the street to a customer’s home (see Figure 1). At the time, lead pipes were standard
issue in the development of water systems across the United States in the 1800 and 1900s (Rabin
2008). Lead, often described as “the useful metal,” become a ubiquitous toxin during this time
of widespread usage, and efforts to reduce or regulate lead exposure in the last century have had
to balance its usefulness to producers and consumers with its potential dangers (Warren 2001).
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The current scientific consensus is that there is no level at which lead is considered to be safe for
humans and is particularly harmful for children, increasing risk of damage to the brain and
nervous system, and possible impairment of their physical, learning and behavioral development
(CDC, 2016). Although concerns about the potential health effects of water run through lead
pipes were raised as early as 1859, the engineering advantages of lead – more malleable,
therefore easier to bend around existing infrastructure, and longer lasting at 35 years, as
compared to 16 for iron – outweighed any nascent appreciation of the public health risk (Rabin
2008). When that calculus finally flipped in the mid-1900s, in spite of the valiant lobbying
efforts of Lead Industries Association, state and local plumbing codes were revised ad hoc to
limit the use of lead pipes in their water systems (Schmidt & Hall 2016b; Rabin 2008). As a
result of nearly a century of infrastructure development and differentiated responses across
hundreds of local drinking water authorities, the EPA estimates that amongst the 52,000 drinking
water systems across the country today, nearly 10 million lead service lines (LSL) are still in use
(Smith 2015c). Given the monumental cost and complexity of excavating and replacing all lead
pipes across the country, Congress never mandated system-wide replacements; instead,
guidelines were provided by the 1986 Congressional amendment to the Safe Drinking Water Act
and augmented by the EPA’s 1991 Lead & Copper Rule (LCR) (40 C.F.R 141 § 1, 1991) to
make each municipality responsible for monitoring and mitigating potential health risks for their
respective populations.

3.3 Cryptosporidium and back again
By the 1990s, Milwaukee had developed its Water Works into an acclaimed water
supply, consistently exceeding both EPA purity standards and the (stricter) Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources standards. But in April 1993, Milwaukee experienced an
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outbreak of cryptosporidium parvum, an oocyst capable of bypassing standard water treatment
regimes which causes severe diarrheal illness, a shocking indictment of a water system that was,
by all available metrics, a gold standard of water purity. By the time the outbreak was under
control, 400,000 Milwaukeeans had suffered gastrointestinal illness, and at least 69 people had
died (Ceraso 2013). Reflecting on the outbreak, former Milwaukee Water Works superintendent
Carrie Lewis said that the extensive testing done today by MWW is the direct legacy of the
outbreak, one which “made us realize that we were in the public health protection business” (qtd.
in Ceraso 2013). The cryptosporidium outbreak also left a direct legacy on the institutional
operations of the Milwaukee Water Works, as well as on its public outreach, awareness and
engagement strategies. In the wake of the outbreak, MWW had declined to make any public
comment for over a week (Foss-Mollan 2001), a decision which resulted in widespread panic
and confusion. MWW has since prioritized public comment, although it places significantly less
emphasis on transparency — a strategy, activists contend, that is more concerned with managing
a crisis of possible public anxiety than with managing real-life public health crises. The fact that
Milwaukee’s water could be fatal despite routinely testing so well informed a greater investment
in an analysis of both the chemical composition of the water and a broadening of the potential
scope of risk: while the majority of water systems test for only the standard EPA-regulated list
(91 containments), Milwaukee Water Works tests for more than 500 chemicals annually and
publicly posts the results (Ceraso 2013).
These changes were part of Milwaukee’s broader reinvestment in its water management
systems and technology following the outbreak, a campaign to rebuild public trust and draw
investment by rebranding the city as the ‘Freshwater Capital of the World.’ With the help of
massive private investment, Milwaukee sought to reinvent itself as a global destination for water
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technology. The Water Council, a non-profit organization and investment hub was developed by
Richard Meeusen in 2009 to “support economic growth in the region, attract new talent and
develop the technology to solve the world's water problems” through partnerships with more
than 180 businesses, government agencies and education programs (Muller 2013). The Water
Council has since helped to draw more than $4 million in grants for job creation and research,
and seems positioned to continue to draw even more human capital to the area: in 2014,
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, one of the Water Council’s partners, opened the School of
Freshwater Sciences, a pioneering graduate program (Muller 2013). With the 2015 revelations
of widespread lead service laterals, Milwaukee’s sterling reputation as the Freshwater Capital of
the World — and the considerable investments attached to it — are being challenged.

Figure 2 — Water Council branding
Source: TheWaterCouncil.com

3.4 Testing urban lead levels
In spite of the staggering number of lead service lines currently in use, more than 99% of
the country’s drinking water systems, including Milwaukee, meet the federal requirements for
safe lead levels in drinking water — or at least, they do on paper. Federal regulations dictate the
frequency of monitoring, the number of samples to be collected, a tiering system to determine
the selection of sampling sites, and “action levels” of lead concentration. However, although
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there is no level at which lead is considered to be safe for humans, these regulations do not
require that lead-compliant water systems will be lead-free or even lead-safe; rather, the water
system is only considered ‘dangerous’ when more than 10 percent of sampled household taps
exceed 15 parts of lead per billion (ppb). Until ten percent of homes tested surpass this EPAmandated threshold, the entire populace is deemed to be lead-compliant — in fact, remediation is
not required unless the ten percent threshold is met, even if nine percent of the homes sampled
tested at exceedingly high levels. In this calculus, homes within the sample that are ‘unsafe’ are
a necessary, expected counterweight to the health of the system at large.
In spite of the somewhat lenient federal regulations, municipal water departments have
arrogated to themselves the task of managing the ‘safety’ of lead levels in their water supply by
means of both manipulation and evasion. A June 2016 study conducted by the Guardian
concluded that water departments in thirty-three American cities and towns, including
Milwaukee, had regularly employed testing methods that deliberately circumvented the US
Environmental Protection Agency’s testing guidelines, resulting in lower detected levels of lead
in households (Millman & Glenza 2016). Milwaukee, along with twenty other cities, had
instructed testers to ‘pre-flush’ the pipes before testing for lead, a tactic that helps clear lead
particles from the plumbing before the sample is collected (Millman & Glenza 2016).

3.5 Uncovering Milwaukee’s lead levels
Despite these tactics, 2015 tests conclusively revealed lead levels of more than 100 parts
per billion — nearly seven times the federal safety level — in 24 of Wisconsin’s 72 public
county water systems (Schmidt & Hall 2016a). These tests were compounded by a 2015 pilot
study conducted by Milwaukee Water Works (MWW) when they began an accelerated water
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main replacement program, and were intended to determine the effects of the replacement work
on lead levels in nearby residences. Partial line replacements have been shown to cause higher
levels of lead contamination, as the disturbance caused by working on the line can dislodge
corroded lead particles, sending them into residents’ water supply (Trueman et al. 2016). The
survey identified six residences affected by the water main replacement project and tested their
tap water before replacement work began, the day following the replacement, and conducted a
follow-up test four weeks later. When the tests revealed elevated lead levels in all six homes
immediately following the water main replacement (Stone 2016), MWW immediately suspended
all ongoing and planned water main replacement projects where LSLs were present. Although
the City has since acknowledged that nearly 100,000 such lead pipes are still in use today (Figure
3), their initial response was to distribute a letter to 70,000 ‘at-risk’ Milwaukee residences where
the age of the home (built prior to 1951, the year the city discontinued the use of lead in
plumbing materials) indicated that a LSL might be present. The letter, a reassuring testament to
the unassailable safety of Milwaukee’s water supply, noted in particular that “Lead is not found
in Milwaukee’s source water, Lake Michigan, nor is lead in our treated drinking water. Your
water meets all federal guidelines for safety” (Appendix A). Ironically, the letter also detailed
“steps you can take to further reduce your risk of lead exposure,” among which were flushing —
the very same technique the City had employed to avoid the detection of lead for EPA samples
(Appendix A).

3.6 Milwaukee: the segregated city
Of course, lead laterals are not the only source of exposure to lead, and the City of
Milwaukee has a strong history of lead abatement work, chiefly through its Childhood Lead
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Figure 3 — Lead Service Line Distribution in the City of Milwaukee, 2016
Source: City of Milwaukee. Data Source: Milwaukee Water Works
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Poisoning Primary Prevention Program. Although the program is limited in scope and only
focuses on mitigating lead exposure through paint chips on residential window sills it is, per the
city’s website, ”a nationally recognized, award-winning program working to prevent lead
exposure to children and provide comprehensive services to children and families” (City of
Milwaukee). The program provides grants to eligible property owners to replace old windows
that may contain lead-based paint; as of December 2016, the program has certified 17,785
housing units as “lead-paint safe,” although the program only provides subsidies for low-income
residents with children living in six of the city’s ZIP codes on the North Side: 53206, 53208,
53209, 53210, 53212 and 53216 (City of Milwaukee). The ease with which the city can
explicitly connect income level to geography is the direct result of the oft-cited and much-studied
persistence of socioeconomic inequality and racial discrimination in 21st century Milwaukee,
which has left the city with a housing supply that inequitably distributes lead risk and lead
exposure.
Milwaukee’s current patterns of segregations are due in no small part to the city’s legacy
of redlining in the 1930s, and the racially-motivated policies and politics which continue to
maintain these patterns of segregation today. Initially, Milwaukee’s housing stock and
demographic patterns developed for many decades in patterns familiar to many early urban
theories: laborers and recent immigrants lived close to the factories in the downtown area. Many
eventually moved “up and out” into what can be considered first-ring suburbs, where through ad
hoc modifications and renovation projects, homeowners managed to accommodate growing
families or supplement their income with rent from tenants (Simon 1996). The suburbanization
of Milwaukee was facilitated by subdivision, streetcar extension, and the desires of wealthier
middle-class residents to self-segregate from newer, lower status immigrants, ‘escaping’
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congested urban centers for the more ‘idyllic’ wards on the periphery of the urban core (Simon
1996). During the Great Migration, subsequent waves of African American migrants were
confined in their housing options to certain neighborhoods, a racialized effect seen in urban
centers across the country as a result of the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) maps,
redlining practices that rated the “desirability” of urban areas for investment opportunities, and
the predatory practices of unscrupulous real-estate brokers (Jackson 1985, Coates 2014). While
the notion that a city’s built environment will develop unevenly can hardly be considered a novel
concept (Harvey 1989; Smith 1984), the initial inequity of Milwaukee’s housing market was
further exacerbated by myriad factors: the concentrated segregation it produced; the decline of
manufacturing; economic restructuring; White flight; suburbanization; and the recent US housing
crisis, to name a few (Bonds, Kenny & Wolfe 2014).
As a result of these historical factors, Milwaukee’s uneven development has contributed
to a dramatically differentiated and racialized housing market. Squires et al. (1991) show that in
Milwaukee neighborhoods where non-Whites account for 24% or more of the population, almost
half of the housing stock was built prior to 1940; for areas where Whites make up 24% or more
of the population, almost 70% of the housing stock was built after 1940. As this thesis will
explore, the risk associated with the LSLs is not distributed uniformly throughout the city, even
if the LSLs themselves were once uniformly dispersed amongst the most central and
(contemporaneously) populous districts. Rather, because residential lead exposure comes from
paint, soil (as a result of paint dust) and water, patterns of disinvestment means older homes in
certain areas of the city have been left with their original — and risky — lead paint and
plumbing, posing a significantly higher risk to their inhabitants.
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3.7 FLAC: The Freshwater for Life Action Coalition
Following the distribution of the 2016 MWW letter, news of the 70,000 LSLs was
minimally publicized, garnering a subdued public reaction; among those who were made aware
was Robert Miranda, a longtime Milwaukee community organizer and political strategist.
Miranda found the city’s response to be insufficient and misleading, by minimizing the dangers
posed to residents and the spatial magnitude of the problem. Miranda enlisted other community
members to develop an advocacy group, the Freshwater for Life Action Coalition (FLAC), and
turned to Drs. Yanna Lambrinidou and Mark Edwards, scientists who had played pivotal roles in
the lead organizing efforts in Washington, DC and Flint, respectively, for scientific expertise
with which to combat the city’s official contentions that the water was safe. Since its 2016
inception, FLAC has devoted its efforts to agitating for legislative change and aggressively
disseminating public information in a direct challenge to the city through press releases, press
conferences, community events and public protests. From the outset, FLAC’s core demand has
been consistent, even as the group has adjusted to accommodate shifting political realities: the
city must remove all of the lead laterals, and must do so at no cost to homeowners.
In response to increasing public awareness and anxiety, the Common Council established
a Water Quality Task Force (WQTF) in July 2016, comprised of members of the Common
Council, Department of Public Works, Health Department, the community, and the medical
profession. For two years, the WQTF served as both the public face of the city’s efforts to
remediate the issue and the most readily available platform for community members, local
businesses and activists to challenge the city’s response to the issue. The WQTF oversaw the
unveiling of the City’s “Lead Awareness Campaign” (see Section 5.4 for further discussion) and
sponsored Ordinance 160742, passed by the Common Council in December 2016. The
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ordinance ensures that LSLs will be replaced if they are discovered in the course of regular main
replacement work, but does not include plans for expedited replacement, meaning full
remediation under the ordinance could take up to 150 years.

3.8 Scandal and visibility
The greatest boon to the group’s organizing may have come in January 2018, when
Health Commissioner Bevan Baker abruptly resigned amidst allegations that the Milwaukee
Health Department (MHD) had failed to notify thousands of Milwaukee families about their
children’s high blood lead levels (Jannene 2018). FLAC’s main challenges have been
overcoming Milwaukeeans’ unfamiliarity with the issue of LSLs and their unwillingness to
believe there is any danger — an unwillingness, this paper contends, that stems in part from the
unique attributes of lead. However, the public scandal in January brought widespread news
coverage of Milwaukee’s LSLs, along with unfolding revelations of wrongdoing and
mismanagement within the Milwaukee Health Department (MHD). With this coverage came the
revelation that Milwaukee’s lead situation might not, in fact, be as under control as city officials
had previously led residents to believe; between 2015 and 2017, MHD tested 75,000 children for
lead exposure as part of the city’s Lead Poisoning Prevention Program, and although 320
children tested at higher than ‘normal’ or even ‘severe’ lead levels, nearly 120 of the affected
families never received the required notification or home visit to remove potential sources of
lead exposure. Of the nearly 6,000 children whose blood tested at ‘low’ lead levels, only 1,500
letters were sent to alert the affected families (Delong & Spencer 2018). News of these failures
has mobilized more Milwaukee residents to join with FLAC; more than 75 community members
attended a February 14th protest at City to demand change from elected officials, and FLAC’s
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list of coalition partners has grown significantly. The coalition now includes groups from across
the city: Milwaukee’s Democratic Socialists of America (DSA); the Greater Milwaukee Green
Party; the Party for Socialism and Liberation; the Interfaith Conference of Greater Milwaukee;
the International Socialists Organization; the Wisconsin Poor People’s Campaign; the Original
Black Panthers of Milwaukee; Wisconsin Industrial Workers of the World, and more.
Baker’s departure seems to represent a pivotal moment for the Milwaukee organizers; not
only has it brought unprecedented attention to the issue, it has created a unique political
opportunity. After the Common Council rejected Mayor Barrett’s nominee for Interim Director,
former MHD commissioner Paul Nannis, they nominated Patricia McManus, a longtime
community advocate and President/CEO of the Black Health Coalition of Wisconsin. For many
organizers, McManus represents the possibility of an ‘inside man,’ an advocate within MHD
who will work towards greater transparency and be a potential partner as FLAC pursues
legislation to remediate the LSLs. To a certain extent, this political upheaval has created a
tipping point in the organizing which is beyond the scope of this paper — it remains to be seen if
Baker’s departure, increased media coverage and McManus’ appointment will together create the
conditions for FLAC to succeed in mobilizing residents and holding government accountable.
However, I believe that the conditions that led to this point are still worthy of our attention, as
they reveal the compromises, challenges and successes a local group of organizers have faced in
attempting to make an invisible issue not only visible but motivating through the use of
collective-action frames.
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4 - METHODOLOGY
In the theoretical framework and background sections, I have identified some important
gaps that must be addressed in the unique case of framing Milwaukee’s urban lead
contamination; specifically, the unacknowledged role of non-humans and the dynamics of risk
and responsibility. This research endeavors to ask which framings have been employed by social
movement actors in the current case in Milwaukee, and what challenges have they faced. In
order to answer these research questions, this study relies on qualitative methods, using a variety
of data sources and gathering methods, including qualitative data collected between November
2016 and April 2018 as a participant observer, discourse analysis of FLAC materials and indepth interviews with organizers. Because the group’s framing has necessarily evolved over
time to account for changes in the political opportunity structure and the visibility of the group’s
efforts, these qualitative methods allowed me to not only engage with the breadth of the framings
employed over the length of the study, but also to speak with organizers to uncover the intentions
and interpretations behind different framings and tactics the group employed. In order to more
closely interrogate this study’s research questions, which ask how external factors have shaped a
LSM’s efforts, in-depth interviews and participant observation were necessary to supplement
findings drawn from coding analysis, providing insight as to the motivations behind certain
framings.
Over the course of a year and half, I attended Water Quality Task Force (WQTF)
meetings, community-organized informational events, an activist-organized protest, Milwaukee
Common Council meetings, organizer strategizing meetings, and a community information
session organized by 16th Street Community Health Centers (hereafter referred to as SSCHC).
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My personal observations of interactions between organizers and activists, City employees,
elected officials and members of the community contributes greatly to this study’s understanding
of the discourses and rhetoric employed in the course of the evolution of framing the issue of
Milwaukee’s lead laterals. As an overt participant-observer of events and meetings, I was often
taking notes and recording presentations; in this capacity, I was recognizable as a student
researcher, and freely introduced myself as one, which allowed me to both capture the official
remarks and engage with other attendees.
In this way, I was able to recruit organizers and activists to participate as potential
interviewees, from which a large portion of my research findings were drawn (for a full list of
interview participants, see Appendix B). I conducted nine open-ended, semi-structured
interviews using a set of questions (see Appendix C) that served as a basis for my conversations;
subsequent lines of questioning were drawn determined by interviewees’ responses, expertise
and interests. I conducted three separate, formal interviews with FLAC founder and
spokesperson, Robert Miranda, as well as with two FLAC organizers, two City officials, two
community organizers and leaders of two of FLAC’s partner organizations. Although all were
welcome to participate, interviewees were ultimately identified based on their proximity to the
efforts of activists and organizers and their ability to speak authoritatively on behalf of the group
they represented. Having regularly attended WQTF and community meetings, it was relatively
simple to identify the activists and organizers who were core members of FLAC and FLAC
partner organizations efforts and to approach them personally and ask them if they would be
willing to participate in my research. Although all interviewees were able to speak on behalf of
the group(s) they represented by nature of their position, interviewees were made expressly
aware that they were only expected to speak for themselves as individuals, and to reflect their
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own personal interpretations of events and actions and were not expected to speak as
representatives of a particular group or organization.
Although I conducted formal interviews, both over the phone and in-person, many of the
statements made by the persons interviewed for this research were either echoed or expanded
upon in the numerous organizing meetings and community events I attended. The analysis in
this thesis, therefore, is drawn from a combination of statements made within the context of an
interview (for which I am able to provide quotes, which appear through the thesis) and
statements made in the context of organizer meetings or community events, for which I rely on
my own notes and interview participants’ recollections.
For the purposes of this research, I secured IRB approval by describing the scope,
significance and data collection methods for the project, and providing sample consent forms and
interview questions (Appendix C). Pursuant to my IRB approval, participants were able to
consent to having their names included with this research; although several interviewees did
consent to having their identities included, I decided to obscure the identities of all participants,
by replacing names with job roles or connection to FLAC (e.g. FLAC organizer).
The one notable exception to this is Robert Miranda, who is the founder, lead organizer
and spokesperson for FLAC. Miranda — who has consented to the use of his real name — has
been the driving force behind FLAC’s organizing, and is inseparable from the group’s efforts.
Indeed, he was referenced by name in nearly every interview I conducted, and I myself
interviewed him on three separate occasions over the course of my research. Because of how
central and vital Miranda is to FLAC’s efforts and to this research, this thesis relies heavily upon
these interviews I conducted with him, and press materials he has written for the group. His
words appear most frequently in this paper, which is as it should be: to a certain extent, Robert
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Miranda is FLAC, and any analysis of FLAC’s efforts is an examination of Miranda’s efforts.
As one organizer put it, “what got us here to begin with when it wasn't an issue to almost anyone
was Robert [Miranda]. Someone who cared enough to carry that when no one else was really
carrying it. And that is difficult, that takes a special kind of person” (FLAC organizer). For all of
these reasons, and given his explicit consent, it was clear that a pseudonym would a pseudonym
be insufficient to disguise his identity.
All interviews were recorded, transcribed and inductively coded; after a preliminary rereading of the transcripts, I identified initial themes and categories within and among each
interviews, with particular attention given to words or statements indicative of framings,
responsibility, culpability, and rationale, of which four main themes emerged: (i) the City of
Milwaukee is untrustworthy, or is more concerned with protecting its own interests; (ii) the
community is insufficiently aware of the issue; (iii) segregation produces uneven effects; and (iv)
the City’s current response has been insufficient. After coding the interviews using these
themes, several of the obstacles faced by FLAC’s organizers did not seem to be particularly well
articulated by the existing labels, and so additional categories were created: (v) residents’
responsibilities in mitigating risk; and (vi) the uniqueness of lead.
The findings drawn from interviews and participant observation were supplemented by a
discourse analysis of publicly available information, including public Facebook posts by FLAC
organizers and FLAC-organized Facebook events (the group’s primary method of organizing and
community outreach); FLAC press releases and interviews, drawn from KINGFISHmke.com
(one of FLAC’s partners) and other media outlets; and official government documents, such as
inter-departmental correspondence and public memorandums. In addition, this research benefited
greatly from analysis of data drawn from a rank-order survey conducted by 16th Street
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Community Health Centers (SSCHC) at two lead education events held in 2018. The survey was
designed and distributed by SSCHC, who compiled the results in a spreadsheet, which they
generously shared with me for the purpose of this study. Statistical data was drawn from the
City of Milwaukee’s public-facing data tool, the ‘Online Aldermanic District Statistics.’ All
other figures in this study, including maps, are publicly-available figures developed by the City
of Milwaukee and the Milwaukee Health Department, as noted.
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5 - FINDINGS
In the following sections, I will explore FLAC’s organizing history and identify some of
the external factors that shaped the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framings the group
employed. In doing so, I seek to answer how FLAC organized in the absence of a crisis — or, to
put it another way, by what tactics the group managed to bring an otherwise invisible crisis to the
fore of Milwaukee’s public and political agenda. Although this thesis highlights some of the
substantial successes of FLAC’s organizing efforts, I also argue that some of the complications
of the group’s initial framing — focused on both government malfeasance and the presence of a
public health crisis — led to an ambiguous and bifurcated response by elected officials, the
public, and non-profit organizations. Resources and attention have subsequently been divided
between addressing potential long-term solutions, a job which is necessarily relegated to elected
officials, and addressing the health risks associated with LSLs, which has largely been left to
non-profit organizations and residents. To be clear, this is not an attempt to argue that FLAC’s
framing has in some way failed to succeed in holding government accountable, or that the group
is responsible for the complex and inadequate current municipal response to the LSLs; rather, I
argue that several distinctive properties of lead and of Milwaukee’s lead laterals directly
contribute to perception of the risks associated with LSLs and attendant interpretations of
culpability and responsibility.
I begin by revisiting FLAC’s earliest and most consistent framing, that Milwaukee’s lead
laterals posed a compelling public health risk, and the government was intentionally misleading
residents as to the extent of the issue. I then explore the effects of the lack of publicly available
information, and how this both supported FLAC’s diagnostic and motivational frames and
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similarly created an opportunity to educate and mobilize residents. The following section
explores in detail how LSLs and lead poisoning risks are unevenly distributed throughout
Milwaukee; although this is, to a certain extent, an issue that affects all of Milwaukee, it
disproportionately affects certain neighborhoods and demographic groups. In this section, I
explore the related implications for residents, organizers and elected officials. I follow with an
analysis of some of the city’s responses to FLAC’s organizing, and the ways in which they are
not only insufficient to address the magnitude of problem, but further relegate responsibility to
residents and non-profit organizations. I conclude with a discussion of non-humans — lead itself
— to ask in what ways the unique properties of the laterals contributed to FLAC’s framings and
organizing efforts or shaped the context within which they sought to mobilize residents.

5.1 Truth Will Out: Diagnostic Framings at FLAC’s inception
When Robert Miranda first began sharing information about Milwaukee’s lead laterals,
he undertook what may be described as a one-man social media campaign to educate the public
on the issue of lead laterals, an issue he felt had been intentionally concealed. Reflecting on
what initially compelled him to begin organizing, Miranda explains:
I followed what happened in Washington DC, and then I followed what happened
in Flint. And then I heard Milwaukee, the way they were talking, and I thought to
myself there’s something wrong here, when the Commissioner of the Department
of Health is interviewed on CBS 58 and he audacitly [sic] says on TV in public
‘no lead comes out of the tap water’ and I knew that was wrong. So I said, I think
I better organize because people are buying this nonsense that our water’s
completely safe, and I knew that not to be an accurate statement (R. Miranda,
personal interview).
Drawing a direct line from two of the most recent fatal and near-fatal widely publicized lead
crises in the United States, Flint, MI and Washington, DC, Miranda felt there was enough of a
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Table 2 — Elements of FLAC framings
Diagnostic

Prognostic

Motivational

We have 70,000 homes in Milwaukee
with lead pipes and there are over
100,000 homes in Wisconsin with lead
pipes passing on lead contaminated
water. (Miranda, 2016).
--Neither the Mayor nor the Common
Council are moving with the urgency
that this health crisis deserves (FLAC,
2018a)
--“There has been a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, misdirect the
public on the issue of lead water in the
city of Milwaukee.” (R. Miranda,
personal interview)
--The City of Milwaukee cannot be
considered the "Freshwater Capitol of
the World" or the "Fresh Coast City", if
they will not provide lead-free drinking
water to the people that live in its own
backyard. (Goodson, 2016)
--Mayor Barrett, his bureaucrats and his
surrogates should be ashamed of
themselves. Years of inactivity and
failed policy which should have been
established to protect the public health
over the past decade has resulted
homeowners and residents with half
measures [...] (Johnson & Miranda,
2016a)

“Remove the lead pipes. There is
no other alternative to eradicating
lead in water, it’s just to remove
the lead pipes. Our purpose is to
push the government to prioritize,
to send resources towards
removing lead pipes, but before
doing that we also have demanded
that the mayor and the bureaucracy
at city put together a
comprehensive strategic plan on
how to do this.” (R. Miranda,
personal interview)
--Demand: for the City to develop a
comprehensive plan for lead
removal and mitigation (pipes and
paint). This plan must not burden
home owners and renters with
implementation costs, it must
continually provide water filters to
affected residences, and must
include the complete removal of all
lead laterals in the City within a
generation. (FLAC, 2018b)

Homeowners have paid enough.
Tens of thousands of Milwaukee
residents drinking water
contaminated by lead lateral pipes
has cost this community in failing
schools, increased violent crime in
our streets and high infant
mortality. Enough is enough
already! (Johnson & Miranda,
2016b)
--All Mayor Barrett wants to do is
give us filters (which they only
have 2,000 to provide to over
70,000 homes and that do not
eliminate all of the lead from the
drinking water) and have
homeowners and residents pay part
of the lead service line
replacement. Homeowners and
residents paying for lead service
lines replacement? We say no!
(Johnson & Miranda,2016a)
--“Our government hasn’t been very
straightforward with us, just like
their [Flint’s] government hasn’t
been very straightforward with
them.” (R. Miranda, personal
interview)

Note: Sources cited here are fully listed in the references section unless excepts are from personal interviews (denoted by
quotation marks).

parallel to be concerned that Milwaukeeans were being intentionally misled by their elected
officials, and as a result of this misinformation were too unaware of their predicament and its
potential dangers to demand any change from their leaders. This first, crucial diagnostic framing
— that Milwaukee city government was misrepresenting the truth to its residents — has
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remained consistent throughout FLAC’s years of organizing, and has played a critical role in
developing motivational frames that urge Milwaukeeans to challenge official narratives and
educate themselves. In this initial and crucial iteration, Miranda was flexing the classic
transformative function of a frame (Snow 2013) by helping to reconstitute the ways in which
Milwaukeeans saw both their pipes and their elected officials, and focusing the relationship
between the two as a mobilizing grievance. And yet, in this first frame and in FLAC’s continued
organizing, the emphasis is divided between the harm done to residents by the lead laterals and
the harm done to residents by their potential untrustworthy elected officials, with the emphasis
weighted towards the latter.
It is worth noting that although the framings employed by FLAC out the outset have been
consistent over their years of organizing, these are not the only framings the group could have
pursued. For example, although FLAC has identified Milwaukee’s city government as solely
responsible for remediating the city’s lead laterals, the activists could instead have identified
property owners and negligent landlords as antagonists. Because lead exposure is so closely tied
to the age and quality of housing stock, these actors could wield immense power in mitigating
the incidences of lead exposure for many low-income Milwaukeeans. And, in an increasingly
neoliberal context that favors market solutions and individuated responsibility, landlords and
property owners would perhaps make a more easily obtainable target for FLAC’s organizing
efforts. However, the group’s diagnostic framings have unequivocally held government
responsible. This framing seems to recognize a decision on FLAC’s part to prioritize their
principle of universal removal of the lead pipes over expediency or short-term feasibility, a
willingness to focus explicitly on comprehensive remediation and the spatial and political
breadth of the issue, rather than on smaller and more achievable goals. (These tensions, between
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short-term ‘achievable’ goals and long term ‘comprehensive’ solutions are explored in greater
detail in subsequent sections.) The group’s chosen framing also emphasizes universal
government responsibility over individuated, neoliberal solutions and the inherent inequalities of
access, such as concerns that without effective government oversight, negligent landlords would
not be compelled to action (see section 5.4 for more discussion). By choosing to pursue a
framing which holds government solely accountable, FLAC therefore committed itself to the
principle that “homeowners have paid enough” (Johnson & Miranda, 2016b), advocating on
behalf of all affected residents — even those who are financially capable of mitigating the risks
posed by lead laterals with no government support —for a comprehensive solution, rather than a
piecemeal response by homeowners.
It is helpful to note that, although largely driven by Robert Miranda, FLAC’s
mobilization frames are not simply Miranda’s personal interpretations. The concept of
“framing” exists in contrast to the psychological concept of “schema,” in that frames do not
merely reflect individual attitudes, but rather are reflective of the process of reality construction,
or the negotiation of shared meaning amongst multiple actors (Gamson 1992). FLAC, since its
earliest inception, has always been a collaborative efforts; convinced that the public was being
misled, Miranda asked a number of groups to join him in forming a coalition, including the
NAACP of Milwaukee, WISDOM (a statewide network of faith communities in Wisconsin), the
Black Health Coalition of Wisconsin and a number of local community organizers and activists:
We all came together, we met, I gave my presentation as to what I felt were
misleading statements, not totally accurate statement. They, being [of] sound
mind, very astute people, researched what I had to say, we came back together,
and we formed an alliance coalition (R. Miranda, personal interview).
When the group held their first press conference in March 2016, the motivational framing they
had collectively produced was a direct challenge to the City on two counts, disputing their
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official stance on a possible public health crisis by “calling attention and questioning the city’s
position about our water being totally safe” (R. Miranda, phone interview) and calling into
question their political priorities: “the mayor is worried about building his Camelot downtown
while residents across the rest of the city are being exposed to lead-contaminated water” (R.
Miranda, qtd. in Mendez 2016). Therefore, although the initial framing undoubtedly reflects
Miranda’s own “schema,” it similarly reflects the collective efforts of FLAC’s initial coalition
members, and their strategic reality construction. This fulfills Benford and Snow’s requirements
that acts of framing constitute “an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and
contention at the level of reality construction” (Benford & Snow 2000, 614). By employing a
framing that focused the attention of Milwaukee residents on something that appeared not to
exist, FLAC challenged both the lack of public information and the government’s equivocal
acknowledgment, and sought to explicitly frame the issue as one of government malfeasance,
deceit and neglect.
Although it is not unusual for a diagnostic frame to contain multiple elements or foci, we
may ask whether this initial framing, which articulated the problem as both a crisis of
government malfeasance and a potential public health crisis, created a space for ambiguity in the
future construction of and response to both prognostic and motivational framing. In the
following months and years, a tension would emerge between organizers and elected officials’
efforts to address both elements of the initial diagnostic framing; when resources were devoted to
focusing on government malfeasance, FLAC would find there was insufficient attention paid to
how to redress a public health crisis, and vice versa. Recognizing the complex ways in which
these two elements are connected has been crucial to much of the organizing in Milwaukee, but
once they become articulated as separate issues, they necessitate separate prognostic frames with
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attendant solutions and funding demands. In what ways, then, is this diagnostic framing
somewhat at odds with itself? Given the bifurcated nature of FLAC’s initial framing, there is a
reason to be concerned that a prognostic or motivational frame designed to address government
malfeasance would be at odds with or compromise the efficacy of prognostic and motivational
frames which hold the government exclusively responsible for addressing the health crisis of
lead laterals. Further, because the range of possible solutions for any given problem are
inextricably tied to — and necessarily determined by — how the problem is named, prognostic
and motivational frames and the actions that may result from them are necessarily affected by the
diagnostic framing.
The first component of the diagnostic framing, that the city was shirking its
responsibilities and masking the seriousness of the threat posed to Milwaukeeans, persistently
and effectively positioned FLAC as the truth-tellers at odds with elected officials. This allowed
activists to articulate a clear adversary: the hegemonic bureaucracy of city government, eager to
cover up its misdeeds. One organizer emphasized the “factions” formed by such a framing:
There's a side that's with the mayor and whatever the mayor's proposing, and I
know the mayor's not telling the truth because I know the science. But on the
other hand, there's folks out here like FLAC, there's other organizations trying to
get the word out (FLAC organizer, personal interview).
Although starkly dramatic, this framing was received rather nonchalantly, even by those
Milwaukeeans who might not consider themselves to be particularly radical; as one organizer
explained to me, “I don't think that the city is evil, I'm not an anti-government type, but I think if
you can cover your backside, you do, and I think there's been plenty of that” (Local organizer,
personal interview). The fact this expressly divisive framing was entirely logical for many
residents in some ways points as much to pre-existing tensions between citizens and their elected
officials as it does to a tacit acknowledgment of the supposed nature of politics; the notion that,
49

as this same organizer expressed, “people who had a reason for it to look better than it did
wanted to say ‘oh it's fine, it’s not a big deal’ or ‘oh we’ve got it’ or ‘you guys are overreacting’
and lots of that diversionary kind of thing” (Local organizer, personal interview). By focusing
explicitly on the perceived deceptions of city government and their unwillingness to remedy (or
even recognize) the issue, FLAC was in many ways prescient; the subsequent dismissal of
Milwaukee Health Commissioner Bevan Baker would later serve as a motivating event for many
Milwaukeeans to take seriously the possibility that FLAC had been vocalizing for months: that
not only was there an issue, but that city government had also been complicit in keeping
residents uninformed.
For FLAC’s diagnostic framing to be successful, Milwaukeeans would need to believe
that elected officials had something to protect — a compelling reason to lie or withhold
information. FLAC organizers and other partner organizations have made clear that they feel
that the city’s reputation as the ‘Freshwater Capital of the World’ has played a role in its
dismissals of FLAC’s early diagnostic framings. As the director of one of FLAC’s partner
organizations sees it, the city — and other groups who might stand to benefit from this
‘Freshwater’ reputation — have not done enough to support FLAC’s efforts:
Those ‘freshwater’ people get kind of mad about all this lead talk. You know, we
have UWM School of Freshwater Sciences that hasn’t said a peep about the
problem! We also have the Medical College of Wisconsin, they’re just sitting on
uh, a $44 million endowment and refuses to get involved in the problem. There
are a lot of institutions that just wanna, sort of look the other way ‘cause this is an
uncomfortable topic to discuss (Director of FLAC partner organization, phone
interview).
Although many professionals within these institutions have spoken out against contaminants in
Milwaukee’s water supply, FLAC and other organizers have interpreted a nearly universal lack
of institutional support for their campaign. This perspective reinforces any lack of government

50

transparency as motivated, in part, by a desire to protect the City’s reputation as not simply
competent, but exceptional in regards to its water technology. As a longtime community
advocate put it, “politicians like to look at their legacy, and there’s a couple legacies certainly
Mayor Barrett wants, and that’s one of [them], to have established this whole ‘Worldwide
Freshwater’ piece” (Community advocate, phone interview).
FLAC interprets the city’s continual emphasis on the purity of Milwaukee’s water supply
and the city’s water technology as an intentional attempt to misdirect from the issue of the LSLs.
From the outset — beginning with the letter sent to 70,000 at-risk residents — elected officials,
Milwaukee Water Works (MWW) and the city’s Health Department (MHD) have emphatically
assured residents that Milwaukee has a superlative water supply in Lake Michigan and state-ofthe-art water technology treatment standards:
Our [FLAC’s] focus has been always the lead laterals, that's the lead lines that
connect from the main to inside the house. The mayor — and he just recently did
this again — the way he confuses people is by saying that there is no lead in our
water mains. And nobody has ever talked about the water mains, we've never
brought up the water mains, it's always been about the lead laterals. And so when
people who are not very well versed about these lines, [who] don't understand the
issue, when they hear him say that and then they ask around and they look into it,
they'll look and see ‘yeah, well there is no lead in the main. It's all, yeah it's true.’
So they're not really looking into the issue of the lead laterals, which he [Barrett]
personally got them to do by his misleading statements like that. (R. Miranda,
phone interview)
For residents with little familiarity with the issue as framed by FLAC or the science behind lead
poisoning, the city’s statements have continued to seem sufficiently credible to mitigate the need
for any public outcry or action. FLAC’s contention that the city is working to protect its hardwon and lucrative reputation as a global water-technology city, together with a lack of publicly
available information, has hindered FLAC’s efforts to mobilize the public around a framing of
government malfeasance.
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Because lateral lines are partially city-owned and partially resident-owned, the emphasis
given to the physical location of the “safe” water itself seems to further imply that the issue of
lead is located within pipes legally owned by Milwaukee residents, rather than those owned by
MWW. In spite of the fact that MWW and the City of Milwaukee are solely responsible for
ensuring the safety of the water that physically arrives in a property owner’s home (indeed, EPA
testing samples for which MWW is held accountable are collected from residents’ faucets) the
physical division of the main line is the means by which the city has sought to renounce its
obligation to maintain, thereby enjoining property owners to assume responsibility to remediate
the risks. The city purports that it is this last, shortest leg of the water’s journey which makes
residents responsible for the relative ‘safety’ of their drinking water, though the resident neither
planned, constructed nor maintained any aspect of the system of water delivery.
Only since Bevan Baker’s dismissal and the subsequent disclosures of previously
unreleased data have organizers noticed less public resistance to their framing, as events have
contradicted Milwaukee’s status as the capable and adept “freshwater capital.” As Robert
Miranda explained a month after Baker’s departure, there was a noticeable shift in public
perception:
Right now, there is a sense of anger that's starting to permeate around the
community. I think that what happened at the Milwaukee Health Department was
a major wake-up call for people. You know, people are... three years of not
informing people of the lead blood levels... I mean, people don't see that as an
accident, they see that as deliberate [...] This is talk that's going on in the
community now. And I'm not gonna be one to say ‘no that's not the case,’ I'm
gonna be out there saying, you know, you have every right and every reason to
believe that (R. Miranda, phone interview).
The scandal at the Health Department dramatically shifted the political opportunity structure for
FLAC, drawing attention to the lack of public information and casting aspersions on the
government’s trustworthiness. Since the revelations that the government had withheld critical
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information about children’s blood lead levels, failing to alert thousands of families that their
children had tested at ‘low’ or even ‘severe’ levels, residents were more willing to accept
FLAC’s framings and question the city’s reputation as a skilled and reliable administrator of
public health, the ‘Freshwater Capital’ of the world. Further, given how much information had
been withheld, the scandal called attention to how little information on the issue of LSLs was
publicly available.

5.2 A critical lack of awareness
FLAC’s early diagnostic framing asserted that not only did Milwaukee have a potential
health crisis on its hands, but that elected officials were hindering efforts to designate it as such;
critical to both elements of this framing, and to related motivational framings, was the lack of
publicly available information. On the one hand, the lack of information supported FLAC’s
diagnostic framing that government was withholding information to serve its own interests; on
the other hand, it also hindered potential mobilization and activation of the public by reinforcing
the idea that municipal services were functioning properly. FLAC would continue to struggle
against this obstacle until upheavals in government staffing would begin to change the public
perception that, as one organizer put it, something about the situation “just doesn't pass a smell
test” (FLAC organizer, personal interview). However, this same lack of public information
relating to lead laterals and their potential dangers also created an opening for organizers: to
stage their own information campaign on these topics and mobilize residents. When Robert
Miranda began organizing, he notes that he “didn't take a more conventional organizing that
we've seen in the past,” and instead used Facebook and other platforms to “invite interest of
people and basically give knowledge to them through that venue before I started organizing the
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town hall meetings” (R. Miranda, personal interview). By providing information directly to the
community and acting as a corrective to the lack of information — or intentional misinformation
— provided by public officials, this organizing effort further problematized and politicized the
lack of public awareness that necessitates such an informational campaign.
The explicit implication in FLAC’s campaign, that the lack of public awareness is by
design, questions not only the veracity of public officials’ statements but also the role these
officials may have played in intentionally keeping such a public health crisis from garnering
attention. FLAC’s diagnostic and motivational framing around the lack of public information
alleges that this was a condition elected officials both benefited from and actively sought to
ensure, a calculated effort to keep residents in the dark as to the issue’s very existence. Miranda
explained:
In the beginning I saw that it [lack of awareness] prevented people from being
concerned at all. I saw that people were not very worried about it because, from
the beginning, the Mayor's office, the Health Department and the Milwaukee
Water Works was putting out a lot of misinformation, a lot of misleading
information, and a lot of assurances that I had to challenge and that I had to
dismiss and I had to basically show the public it was all a myth. Everything that
they’re putting out there was a myth, and not only a myth but an attempt to
misdirect (R. Miranda, phone interview).
FLAC, therefore, set for itself no small feat — to not only educate the public, but also develop
compelling enough counter narratives to combat the status quo of city with safe water and a
beneficent local government. Even those among FLAC’s members who were less convinced by
a framing of government cover-up readily acknowledged that the lack of information was a
critical impediment to progress of any kind, and indicative of a different kind of malfeasance: “I
think the city… it’s not their fault. I don’t think it’s their fault. I think what’s wrong right now
with the city is that they’re not telling people what they should know. And that’s just bad
representation” (Director of FLAC partner organization, phone interview).
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The depth of public unfamiliarity with the issue, due in no small part to Milwaukee’s
history of successful lead abatement and water quality control, additionally stemmed from
general indifference towards the details of municipal functions in general. Miranda mirthfully
recounted one such anecdote:
In 2015, not many people knew we had a Milwaukee Water Works. They thought
MMSD [Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District] was the one that supplied
their water. People were confused, a lot of people were confused! I mean, I
actually had aldermen, I had professionals...I mean, people who are active!
Everybody thought MMSD was the agency that provided us water, and I said
‘No! That’s the one who takes the stuff out!’ That’s a prime example of the fact
that, how the city has failed to really provide the education the public needed to
protect itself from lead and water. They don’t even have the basic knowledge that
there is a Milwaukee Water Works (R. Miranda, phone interview).
In this context, FLAC was doing more than simply raising awareness of the existence and
dangers of lead laterals and the government’s responsibility for remediation, but rather was
problematizing an action so commonplace — turning on the tap — that many residents had never
even thought to question the structures and systems responsible for the maintenance of such an
everyday need. The status quo of public apathy and disinterest in municipal functionings is
precisely what FLAC maintains the city used to its advantage, and actively worked to ensure as
awareness of the dangers of lead laterals began to spread. As one organizer put it, “people in this
community do not question what their government does. It's a lack of awareness and to be very
honest with you, I don’t believe they [city government] want the community aware” (FLAC
organizer, personal interview). In this way, FLAC explicitly tied the lack of information and
public awareness to their diagnostic framings of government malfeasance.
The compounded effect of these obstacles — a city department (MWW) with an
established record of municipal efficiency, a lack of information, and public unfamiliarity with
the issue — was to create a crisis that was largely invisible to Milwaukee residents, both in their
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daily lives and in policy. This raises a question which has critically guided much of this research
and FLAC’s early efforts: how do you organize in the absence of a visible, recognized crisis?
Without a startling government revelation, a noticeable change in water taste or color or any
visible and motivating public health emergency, FLAC’s motivational and diagnostic framing
needed to compel Milwaukeeans to act, or demand action of their elected representatives, in the
absence of definitive proof of the spatial or physical extent of risk posed by the lead laterals. In
the absence of the perception that a public health crisis exists, how can a nascent social
movement persuade victims that they are, in fact, victims? This quandary underlies much of
FLAC’s early framing and organizing work, which on the one hand leveraged motivational
framings whose vocabularies of motive benefited from a lack of public information and
government acknowledgement, reinforcing a sense of betrayal and neglect. At the same time,
the lack of information and government reassurances served to undermine FLAC’s vocabulary of
urgency, painting the group as radically out of step with the existing state of Milwaukee’s lead
abatement programs and water quality control.
One of the main obstacles for FLAC’s organizing was overcoming the highly technical
language of water science in order to not only reach Milwaukeeans and convince them that the
LSLs existed, but to further persuade them that the laterals posed a significant and mobilizing
risk to their safety. Miranda is pragmatic about the limitations of FLAC’s organizing and
education efforts, which managed to reach many, but may not have gone far enough:
My concern is that they're [Milwaukeeans] just aware of it, they really are not
very versed on the issue. The issue of lead in water is very complicated and can
be difficult to follow when you’re dealing with experts, or dealing with people
who are masters at the language, and masters of the issue, and can easily dismiss
people who are not very well versed on not only the chemistry of what’s going
with the water treatment, but also the impacts that is made to families. (R.
Miranda, phone interview).
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As Miranda notes, the issue of lead in water is complicated; the scientific knowledge
required to debunk the City’s narrative of safe water and safe water treatment set a very
high barrier to entry for many Milwaukeeans who were inclined to trust government
experts. Unfamiliarity with the complex and inscrutable scientific evidence presented by
city officials serves as a compelling reason to believe the (often persuasive) narratives
provided,
Miranda knew that FLAC would need to fight facts with facts in order to combat official
narratives of technical knowledge and scientific expertise. As he’d seen during Alderman Joe
Davis’ 2016 campaign for mayor, it was impossible to fight back simply by calling attention to
the issue:
When Alderman Davis was running for mayor, he was telling people at the time
that there is contamination and the water was being poisoned by lead, but the
mayor was refuting him and telling him and telling the public that that's not true,
and that they have the effective corrosion control treatment measures. And so, you
know, he was able to defeat Alderman Davis' message because he, Alderman
Davis, didn’t have the kind of information that he needed in order to counter what
the message the Mayor was putting out there. And the lesson for me when I saw
what happened there, and that's why I took more of a time to research and more of
a time to understand the issue, because I knew what kind of response campaign
the Mayor was going to come back with. and when I began organizing, and they
began trying to dismiss what I was saying, I already had the playbook, and I was
basically responding to them, showing where they're wrong. (R. Miranda, phone
interview).
As Robert Miranda and FLAC attempted to share information with the public, they relied on lead
experts, such as Drs. Marc Edwards and Yanna Lambrinidou, to add scientific certainty to
FLAC’s framings. Having learned from a campaign that did not manage to contradict the city’s
official narrative of municipal competence and technical expertise, FLAC fought back by
attempting to arm themselves and the public with similar expertise, challenging the city’s
hegemonic use of knowledge.

57

As previously noted, willingness to believe city narratives also stemmed from the simple
— and, FLAC contends, intentional — misconstruing of the location of the risk, as when Mayor
Barrett and other city officials would frequently refer to the safety and purity of Milwaukee’s
water supply and of the city’s water mains. For FLAC, the ease with which residents were able
to be misdirected and mollified was directly connected to the lack of publicly available
information and the specific, proprietary knowledge required to understand the risks posed by
LSLs. As an organizer put it, “folks living in those [affected] zip codes don’t know what’s going
on. They have no perception” (FLAC organizer, personal interview). This quote highlights an
additional nuance, problematizing not only Milwaukeeans’ inclination to trust their government
when it came to their drinking water, but also the larger systemic forces driving apathy — forces
which disproportionately affect certain communities that bear the undue burden of many
political, social and environmental injustices.

5.3 The uneven effects of place
Although the distribution of Milwaukee’s original LSLs does not correspond to 20th
century patterns of racial segregation, the spatiality of lead-related health effects does. Citydeveloped maps of the laterals paint a picture of a largely uniform spatiality, with laterals
distributed throughout thirteen of the city’s fifteen aldermanic districts (Figure 2, Table 4).
However, 2014 city-developed maps of the density and distribution of lead poisoning in
Milwaukee (Figure 4) reveal that, although lead laterals may have initially been evenly
distributed across the city, the risk associated with lead has not been similarly equally dispersed.
In fact, the density map more closely resembles patterns of demographic distribution throughout
the city because the majority of sources of lead exposure are residential — lead-based paint and
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Figure 4 — Lead Poisoning Density in the City of Milwaukee, 2014
Source: City of Milwaukee Health Department
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dust, soil contamination and LSLs — making any map of lead poisoning density also a map of
the quality of housing stock in the city. Given our knowledge of the historic and persistent
patterns of differential investments into Milwaukee's segregated housing market (see Heynen et
al 2006), it is unsurprising to see that although the LSLs may be equally dispersed, the risks
associated with lead exposure are not. Indeed, the systems which preserve and reproduce the
social, political and economic unevenness of Milwaukee’s urban spaces ensure that the risks will
be most acute in those areas most overlooked by investment and policy.
The age of housing stock is currently the single determinant of whether a residence is at
risk of having lead laterals. City estimates for LSL distribution are currently based on which
houses were built prior to 1962, the year the city stopped using lead in municipal projects,
meaning older homes are intrinsically ‘riskier.’ However, although the age of structure might be
the sole determinant for mapping LSLs, it is not the sole determinant for risk. Older houses in
more affluent neighborhoods of the city, while technically ‘at-risk’ by virtue of the age of the
housing stock, are more likely to have benefitted from maintenance incentives and investments
by higher-income property owners, mitigating the risk of exposure to any of the original lead
paint or pipes in the home. On the other hand, the uneven effects of racialized housing practices
and policies, unscrupulous landlords, and decades of neglect means that older housing stock in
certain areas of the city will bear a significantly higher chance of containing decades-old lead
paint, lead plumbing, lead-contaminated soil, and the original lead laterals the home was built
with — all of the primary methods of lead exposure. Put another way, the presumed spatiality of
the LSLs does not make clear the connection between lead and segregation in Milwaukee; only
when we overlay the spatiality of risk for lead poisoning do we reveal the connections between
race, poverty, housing and lead.
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Implications for framing: a city-wide issue
As these maps show, the presence of lead laterals does not necessarily correspond to risk
for every neighborhood, posing a unique quandary for FLAC’s organizing. It is not improbable
that some might look at the lead poisoning density maps and question FLAC’s foundational
notion that LSLs pose a risk, given that the risk does not map uniformly to LSL distribution. In
spite of this, FLAC vehemently maintains that all lead pipes pose a risk, repeatedly emphasizing
the geographic extent of the issue and rejecting the notion that the lead laterals are a spatially
modest and politically manageable issue. The dramatic number of Milwaukee properties
potentially affected by lead laterals — 70,000 — is repeatedly employed by activists, organizers
and community members as part of both diagnostic and motivational frames, a means of
articulating the scale and gravity of the situation given the overwhelming preponderance of
Milwaukeeans who were considered to be at-risk. As to why risk, effect and activism are not
uniformly distributed throughout the city, organizers argue that certain communities are not only
under-informed and inclined to trust their government, but are predisposed to mitigate some of
the risks:
You look at Zielinski’s district [14], which is number one in pipes, and Murphy’s
district [10] which is number two. So you look at what is going on there and you
say okay, you know, what is it that has not galvanized the kind of response you
would think that those two districts, which have a better standing economically
and other political issues than, for example, Russell Stamper’s district [15], what
is causing a delay there? And again, I strongly believe it’s because they [in
affluent communities] are not informed. They are not informed… they have put
their trust in government and the Health Department, they believe that their
water’s safe, they hear all these good things about Milwaukee water, and they
believe it [...] People say to me, well why aren’t their blood levels higher than
areas where there are more [LSLs] and you see high blood levels. Well, you
know, in some cases, probably because they are and have been using filters. It’s
hard to say what’s going on. But you know, what is certain is that, and I know this
is something that I’ve asked many over at City Hall, what is certain is that no one
can guarantee that water flowing through these lead pipes is safe. And I always
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ask that, can you guarantee it? Nobody can (R. Miranda, phone interview).
Because they maintain that every lead pipe is a danger to Milwaukee citizens, here, then is part
of FLAC’s most difficult challenge; before the group can make LSL remediation a politically
viable mission, they must first make visible to a large number of Milwaukeeans the latent,
invisible risk lying beneath their homes, which on one city map places them ‘at-risk’ yet on
another finds them to be risk-free. While this particular hurdle for organizers is dealt with in
greater detail in a subsequent section (see Section 5.5), it is helpful here to demonstrate that
FLAC maintains this is an issue which affects almost every Milwaukee neighborhood and
resident, in spite of lead poisoning data, in spite of residents’ unwillingness to believe, and in
spite of lifestyle choices — such as filters — which may have inadvertently mitigated its most
dangerous effects. Or, as one FLAC organizer succinctly put it: “we all gotta drink the water”
(FLAC organizer, personal interview).
Indeed, this universal framing seems to have purchase, as one of the neighborhoods most
affected by LSLs but least afflicted by lead poisoning has taken the political lead in the fight for
government remediation. Alderman Tony Zielinski represents the disproportionately White 14th
District, which covers the Bay View neighborhood. Although Zielinski's constituents are
predominantly White, highly-educated and employed, their district also has the highest number
of lead laterals in the city: 9,452, or 13.8% of all of the city’s LSLs (see Table 3, 4). Since news
of the laterals — and their distribution — became public, Zielinski has worked with community
organizers and lobbyists to present legislation to the Common Council. For FLAC, this means
that a city-wide framing has political viability and a potentially widespread constituency. As
NAACP president Fred Royal noted, “not all of the City’s problems occur in the 53206,” and this
is therefore not an issue which only affected communities of color, but rather “a citywide issue
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Table 3 — Residential Lead Service Lines by Aldermanic District
Ald. District

Number of Properties
with LSLs

Percent of Residential District
Properties with LSLs

Percent of Citywide LSL
Residential Properties

1

4,747

49.2%

7.0%

2

7

0.1%

0.01%

3

5,104

94.3%

7.5%

4

1,315

82.0%

1.9%

5

1,036

9.7%

1.5%

6

7,243

90.4%

10.6%

7

8,139

74.9%

11.9%

8

6,361

96.9%

9.3%

9

0

0.0%

0.0%

10

9,166

83.0%

13.4%

11

1,627

13.8%

2.4%

12

5,585

93.1%

8.2%

13

2,413

23.8%

3.5%

14

9,452

85.7%

13.8%

15

6,089

78.5%

8.9%

68,284

54.2%

100.0%

Source: Milwaukee Department of Administration Budget and Management Division, 2016

that needs to be addressed” (qtd. in Deprey 2017). If neighborhoods who bear the burden of
LSLs without the equivalent risks of lead poisoning are willing to join with organizers and
demand government action, there is a possibility that every one of the 70,000 affected residences
is a potential site of mobilization for FLAC’s LSM.

Implications for framing: a localized issue
A side-by-side comparison of LSL distribution versus lead poisoning in three of
Milwaukee’s aldermanic districts (Figure 5) makes clear that for LSLs to cause lead poisoning,
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Figure 5 — Lead Poisoning Density vs. Lateral Distribution in Ald. Districts 10, 12 & 14
Source: City of Milwaukee Health Department, Milwaukee Water Works

the risks of the laterals must be compounded by other effects. The density of lead poisoning is
unmistakably more critical in district 12, which, in spite of having the lowest number of LSLs of
all three districts (5,585 laterals, as compared to 9,166 in district 10 and 9,452 in district 14) has
the highest proportion of LSLs: those 5,585 laterals represent 93.1% of all residential properties
in district 12. The demographics of the districts are also significant here (Table 4); not only is
district 12 the only majority non-White of the three districts represented above, it has a
significantly lower average residential value and more than double the number of vacant
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Table 4 — Demographic Information and LSL share by Aldermanic District
District 10
Ald. Michael Murphy

District 12
Ald. José Pérez

District 14
Ald. Tony Zielinski

Total Population
% Non-Hispanic White
% Black
% Asian
% Hispanic

39,980
54.07%
32.25%
2.54%
7.35%

39,808
14.56%
9.29%
1.74%
71.87%

38,512
63.49%
3.1%
1.18%
29.0%

Total Households
Total Properties
Avg. Residential Value
% Vacant

17,148
12,590
$129,139
1.61%

11,860
8,319
$83,516
4.09%

16,310
12,636
$156,167
2.07%

No.of Lead Laterals
% of District Properties
% of Citywide LSLs

9,166
83.0%
13.4%

5,585
93.1%
8.2%

9,452
85.7%
13.8%

Source: City of Milwaukee. Data Source: Online Aldermanic District Statistics

properties. Therefore, alongside an expansive ‘city-wide’ framing, organizers simultaneously
sought to emphasize the locally specific patterns of lateral distribution, highlighting the
disproportionate effects (physical, financial, political) of the laterals upon certain of Milwaukee’s
lower-income, predominantly-minority neighborhoods.
Especially in the poorer communities [...] people just don’t have insurance.
People see that [remediation measures] as a cost that they just can’t afford. And
so for them it’s like, you know, I could spend money to deal with this matter or I
won’t have any money to buy groceries or I won’t have any money to pay for the
light bill. And so you know, it’s a matter of choices here. And you know, so this
is where the government’s gotta come in and say we’re gonna pay for these pipes,
we’re gonna remove all this stuff (R. Miranda, phone interview).
As a result of these realities, FLAC efforts have been focused predominantly on organizing in
low-income neighborhoods on the North side of Milwaukee, “focusing on really trying to
provide information to those communities and our focus is make sure that the government does
what it can to remove the pipes in those areas without any cost to them” (R. Miranda, phone
interview).
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If we accept that the uneven nature of the segregated city will be reproduced in the
density of lead poisoning, there are necessary implications for how the issue of lead laterals will
be framed: who among the most affected are the potential constituents of any nascent social
movement? There is a range of possible framings that we might expect to encounter, including
environmental justice issue that disproportionately affects poor neighborhoods of color, whose
residents are already burdened with other sources of lead exposure. If this an issue that ‘belongs’
to certain areas of the city, remediation would be contingent upon certain elected officials acting
on behalf of their affected constituents, thereby providing political cover to other elected officials
whose constituents have LSLs but have not felt the risks of LSLs.

Political implications of place- and scale-frames
Early diagnostic framing by FLAC and other community members reveal this tension of
scale in their articulations of grievances, between the locally specific effects of the laterals and
their spatially diverse distribution. These inherent tensions are reproduced in the diagnostic and
prognostic framing — who, then, is responsible, and what should the solutions look like? Is this
an issue that requires coalition-building across all neighborhoods and their representatives? Is it
therefore one that holds all elected officials equally responsible for remediation? Or it is a locally
specific issue, for which certain amongst the City’s representatives should be held primarily
accountable, and others might be able to escape notice? Further, what are the political realities of
compelling municipal action — as many local organizers bitterly acknowledge, this is not an
issue that elected officials seem eager to sign on to:
I wouldn’t expect much out of local government. It took a disaster declaration in
Flint, and like a whole bunch of resources from the state and the feds, then. We
don’t have any resources, and we don’t have a disaster. I just don’t see anyone
from the Health Department or the Mayor’s office, or for that matter the Common
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Council wanting to like, do something to change the situation (Director of FLAC
partner organization, phone interview).
The political unattractiveness of this ostensibly city-wide issue coupled with its uneven effects
present a major obstacle for FLAC’s efforts. On the one hand, the group could endeavor to
persuade all Milwaukeeans to call on their elected officials and rely on political coalitionbuilding to develop a comprehensive solution, an unlikely outcome given the demonstrated
unwillingness of politicians to act in absence of a crisis. Alternatively, FLAC could continue its
focused organizing efforts, so as to rally the elected officials responsible for the areas most
disproportionately affected by lead poisoning. By speaking to (and for) different constituencies,
these widely disparate strategies would rely on fundamentally different political opportunity
structures and would each pose a set of distinct challenges and advantages for the group.
Paradoxically, the most vocal elected official, Alderman Zielinski, has been one whose
constituents have the most LSLs but among the lowest cases of lead poisoning; political cover, in
this case, is afforded to those aldermen whose constituents are too disenfranchised to compel
their representatives to action. LSM activists are vociferous in assigning this discrepancy in
action as representative of an unwillingness to take on unpopular issues. This unwillingness, in
turn, originates from the political opportunity structures of Milwaukee, with a political and
demographic context that does not impel leaders to action:
The likelihood of these people [elected officials] doing just about anything on
anything progressive is very small to me. [...] If we want to fix all these things,
they have to go, and people have to stop looking at them as like, installations in
our City Hall. They're just people that can go. Like I said, people in Milwaukee
get used to how it is, they also get used to their poor leaders and don't envision
that there could be another options out there. (FLAC organizer, personal
interview)
The pugnacious efforts of Alderman Zielinski as contrasted with the efforts of some of his fellow
aldermen has come to be seen as demonstrative of the effects of the presumed political cover the
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uneven risk of LSLs can provide elected officials. Zielinski's efforts (District 14) stand in stark
contrast to those of Aldermen Murphy (District 10) and Pérez (District 12), who represent
districts with the second highest number of laterals and the highest number of cases of lead
poisoning, respectively. And yet, these aldermen have been remarkably tight-lipped on the issue,
and have expressed an unwillingness to partner or meet with FLAC and other activists in support
of remediation efforts or publicly acknowledge the gravity of the problem.
In a sense, FLAC is trying to leverage the city-wide scale of the issue to remedy
concentrated effects. The group’s multi-scalar framing relies on the political opportunity posed
by the dramatically widespread dispersal of the LSLs as a motivational framing to ensure
government resources are brought to the areas that are disproportionately affected by lead
exposure and routinely underserved by their elected officials. What, then, are the implications of
multiple iterations of diagnostic and prognostic framings — either city-wide or localized? How
might these multiscalar frames alter the group’s potential activism, resource mobilization, and
remediation? As the last few years have shown, municipal responses to these two framings have
the effect of working against one another; responses have either catered weakly to FLAC’s citywide framing but proved insufficient to the address magnitude of the issue, or have attempted to
address the unevenness of lead risk by making residents more responsible for personally
mitigating those risks. This runs directly contrary to FLAC’s framings: not only do these
municipal responses fail to adequately address the spatial comprehensiveness of LSLs, but they
re-burden those residents who are most affected by lead exposure with the added responsibility
of employing mitigation strategies. A closer examination of these municipal responses will help
to illuminate these tensions in action.
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5.4 Insufficient municipal responses and the individuation of risk
Although the City has responded to some of FLAC’s prognostic framings with interim
solutions, they have been insufficient to address the issue and have effectively shifted
responsibility for mitigating LSL-related risks upon Milwaukee residents, an individuation of
risk for which FLAC’s framing has had to adapt. In lieu of legislative solutions for government
action, the city has instead proposed solutions which are stop-gap measures that place an
additional financial, emotional and physical burden upon residents. These solutions suggest that
residents must assume responsibility for their own health outcomes by taking the following
measures: purchasing and maintaining lead-certified water filters; seeking additional lead testing
for children under the age of three; and flushing the water in their taps for three minutes every
morning, to remove any stagnant water and potential lead particles. Not only do these solutions
place responsibility on residents instead of government, where FLAC contends it ultimately
rests, but they also pose a problem for FLAC’s mission of full removal of the lead laterals
because they are interim measures rather than comprehensive solutions, effectively shifting the
political opportunity structure for organizers. If, in fact, interim measures are able to effectively
manage the crisis by mitigating immediate risks for Milwaukee residents, they may have the
perverse effect of undermining FLAC’s political opportunity by relieving the pressure on
government to pursue comprehensive, long-term solutions.

Water Filters
One of the City’s most significant responses to date — a free filter distribution program
— has still been underfunded and insufficient to address the magnitude of the problem. This
municipal failing has added fuel to FLAC’s framing of an intentionally unresponsive City
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government. The November 2016 filter distribution program was managed in partnership with
Sixteenth Street Community Health Centers (SSCHC). However, the demand far outstripped the
City’s resources; in spite of having initially alerted more than 70,000 homeowners that their
property was at risk as a result of lead laterals, the City only procured 2,000 filters for
distribution, or enough for less than three percent of affected residences (Bence 2016). In fact,
even the Mayor’s promise of 2,000 filters — already a quantity insufficient for the needs of
residents — was an overestimation of what the city could procure; the filters were not purchased
with municipal funds, but with $90,000 raised by The United Way of Greater Milwaukee &
Waukesha County, which was only sufficient to acquire 1,725 filters. From the outset, critics
were vocal about the inadequacy of the filter program, and the City’s inability to fully fund filter
distribution without seeking outside financing, contrasting it with other big-budget projects the
City had successfully undertaken:
Government needs to move on this like they move on stadiums. Like, if they want
to build Miller Park, if they want to build the Bucks stadium, these guys move
fast. You know, they have no problem finding hundreds and hundreds of millions
of dollars to do those kind of things, but when it comes to doing something that is
more of a related to the needs of people, it just seems like they want to drag their
feet. (R. Miranda, phone interview)
Criticisms such as these are premised upon a public perception of the City of Milwaukee as
continuously and intentionally misplacing its priorities, more interested in funding flashy
downtown projects than a meagre filter distribution program, a perception upon which much of
FLAC’s diagnostic and motivational framing rests. For Milwaukee residents, expensive public
projects like the Bucks Stadium, Miller Park and the streetcar (“The Hop”) serve as visible
reminders of the City’s ability to “move fast,” as Robert Miranda puts it, for certain projects. A
stark contrast to the pace at which the City has responded to FLAC’s organizing, these projects
serve to highlight the inadequacy of the City’s response to LSL remediation. This sentiment is
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not restricted to activists and organizers; at a City Council meeting, Alderman Borkowski noted
that “if you can find money for a streetcar, if you can find money for a Bucks Arena” then there
was reason to believe “where there's a will there's a way” to find money for a more
comprehensive municipal response to LSLs (Milwaukee City Council, December 13, 2015).
Anger over the City’s funding priorities was compounded by the inadequacy of the filter
distribution program. Although SSCHC, the City’s non-profit partner organization for the
program, organized two weekday evening events on the South Side of Milwaukee in November
of 2016 and distributed 800 filters, the events were ‘first come first serve,’ and supplies at one
event ran out in less than an hour. Over one hundred residents optimistically left their phone
numbers to be alerted in case more filters became available in the following calendar year, 2017
(WUWM, September 12, 2017). For North Side residents, distribution was only available
through the office of the Social Development Commission, which operates during regular
business hours from 8 a.m. - 5 p.m. on weekdays, a considerable inconvenience for those
Milwaukeeans who are required to be at their own place of work during those hours. A further
limitation for residents are the stipulations for filter eligibility: only households with children
under 6 or with pregnant or breastfeeding women may receive a free water filter, and all
subsequent replacement filtration cartridges (which must be replaced every three months in order
to be maximally effective) are to be purchased at residents’ own expense. Although FLAC
agrees that filters provide the best immediate protection for residents with LSLs, the group has
largely dismissed the utility of the filter distribution program, instead seeing it as evidence of the
magnitude of the issue and the City’s inability — or unwillingness — to sufficiently respond. As
one FLAC organizer put it, “the way that Milwaukee is looking at this issue, [it’s] like you're
putting a band aid on a bullet to the heart” (FLAC organizer, personal interview).
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The limitations and inconsistencies of the filter program have fundamentally shifted the
political opportunity structure by making residents responsible for ensuring their own health
outcomes, effectively relieving government of its obligation to protect residents’ health. For
FLAC, this means that not only has the calculus for potential solutions shifted, but emphasis has
been refocused on a solution that is not financially realistic for all Milwaukeeans. In this altered
political opportunity structure, where filters are the best solution currently available, some now
maintain that it is residents’ responsibility to ‘make good decisions’ and get one, in spite of how
the financial burden might differentially affect residents:
When it comes to like, you know, the filtering issue and how much a filter
product costs, and you know you say, well, I know piles of poor people who can’t
afford a filter….I would argue that if they knew the risk they would make good
decisions, and lots of people would buy their own filters. (Director of FLAC
partner organization, phone interview)
The idea that residents who ‘know best’ will assume responsibility for their health and purchase
a filter mistakenly presumes that all Milwaukee residents are uniformly able to afford and
maintain a water filter. Not only that, it suggests that residents who do not buy a filter are doing
so because they are either ignorant of the risk or indifferent to the outcome — a sweeping
generalization which disregards the real, everyday choices faced by those living at or below the
poverty line. As Robert Miranda put it, “a lot more people are apt to sacrifice their health to
have heat in the home” (R. Miranda, personal interview), a grim reality that underscores FLAC’s
emphatic prognostic framing: government must be held solely responsible for uniformly
removing the sources of lead exposure, because choosing health is not a luxury every Milwaukee
resident enjoys.
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Ordinance 160742
The most ambitious legislative proposal for remediation, Ordinance 160742, is similarly
viewed by activists as a meagre measure with too long a timeframe, leaving Milwaukeeans
vulnerable in the intervening years. The ordinance, passed in December 2016, is a purported
solution to begin addressing the LSLs. It ensures that if an LSL is discovered in the course of
Milwaukee Water Works’ regular main replacement work, the City will replace its portion of the
lateral — and mandates that the homeowner do the same, within 10 days. Because many
homeowners might be unable to pay for a costly emergency project on such short notice, the
ordinance proposed a cost-share plan, whereby the city would assume two-thirds of the
homeowner’s cost, with a maximum cost to the homeowner of $1,600 (which can be paid off
over the course of ten years). Although activists celebrated the passage of legislation, FLAC
took grave issue with the precedent the ordinance established: that residents are responsible for
their LSLs, and for any associated risks or costs.
I am pleased that the Common Council and the bureaucrats at the City are moving
on this. I am disappointed that the legislation did pass because, again, I just
believe wholeheartedly that the taxpayer, the property owner, the homeowner
should not be paying one penny of any shared cost, I don’t care if it’s $1,600,
$800, they shouldn’t be paying one penny (R. Miranda, phone interview).
The ordinance was received with horror by FLAC and other community advocates, who recall
being “stunned” that low-income residents’ inability to pay for this construction would have
draconian consequences — in order to ensure that residents cooperate with these replacements in
a timely way, the ordinance included provisions by which the city could compel homeowners to
cooperate, from issuing fines to shutting off the water supply of non-compliant homeowners.
Additionally, the ordinance did not necessarily signal a departure from MWW’s business
as usual, as replacements would only happen as they coincide with existing, scheduled work and
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infrastructure projects. At best, the ordinance relies upon luck, building efficiencies into
MWW’s existing main replacement program and addressing lead service lines only as they are
discovered in the course of routine work. A former budget specialist for the city explained:
We’ll still be doing [water main] replacements all this time. You know,
presumably. So you know, it may be that we’ll get lucky, and some of the water
mains we replace are ones that otherwise are busted, you know...but you know,
when you’re talking about 60,000 [sic] lead service lines, they could be scattered
all over. (Milwaukee Budget & Management specialist, phone interview)
Any plans to accelerate main replacement (and, by extension, LSLs) were speculative, and even
a best-case scenario would only include and additional 300-500 planned replacements, according
to city budgeting specialists. Therefore, even an ‘aggressively’ scaled-up version of the
ordinance would not present a full solution for nearly 150 years, the length of time required to
replace all 70,000 LSLs at the city’s proposed pace of work, an untenable solution for organizers
and residents. Although FLAC has consistently held government solely responsible for a
comprehensive municipal solution for remediation, due to the limitations of both City resources
and political will organizers have had to balance this with a pragmatism about the need for
immediate, interim solutions, a further individuation of risk that focuses on how residents can
protect themselves until a more comprehensive solution can be achieved.

“Lead-Safe Milwaukee”
Another municipal measure which shifted focus from the lead laterals to individual
behavior was the City’s lead awareness campaign, which debuted in early 2017. The media
campaign, “Lead-Safe Milwaukee” (Figure 6) was comprised of bus ads, a website and
brochures distributed with water bills. The cartoon campaign was in Mayor Barrett’s words, “a
very friendly reminder to parents to do what they can to make sure their kids are safe” (WUWM,
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Figure 6 — 2016 Lead-Safe Milwaukee Campaign, Bus Shelter Ad
Source: LeadSafeMKE.org

September 12, 2017). Many activists dismissed this “friendly reminder” as too mollifying,
placing “safe water” in the context of “safe paint,” “safe kids,” instead of drawing attention to
the dangers posed by LSLs, which organizers deemed to be the public health crisis at hand.
Additionally, activists argued that the campaign placed the burden of responsibility upon
residents and parents for the health of their homes and their children, informing residents of the
steps they should already be taking to keep their families safe and reinforcing the idea of
Milwaukee as a “Lead-Safe” city, per the campaign’s own title. Brenda Coley, FLAC member
and the co-executive director of Milwaukee Water Commons, saw the campaign as evidence of
the city’s priorities, noting “I don’t think they’ve [the City] been much interested in letting the
public know in a concise clear way, what the issue is” (WUWM, September 12, 2017). This
criticism seems to echo FLAC’s contention that the city’s response is not incidentally
insufficient, but rather is rooted — for a host of pernicious reasons — in an unwillingness to
respond sufficiently.
Taken together, these municipal efforts have either directed Milwaukee residents to
assume more personal responsibility for mitigating the risks posed by the LSLs, or (as was the
case with the limited supply of filters) left them with little choice but to find an alternate
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solution. At a North Side community event organized by FLAC in November 2016, residents
repeatedly asked panelists what measures they could take to protect themselves and their families
in the absence of government action. FLAC’s prognostic and motivational framings have had to
account for this delegation of responsibility, placing emphasis on ways residents can help
themselves in addition to lobbying for government-funded solutions. This poses a predicament
for FLAC’s framing and its efforts to organize residents, essentially dividing the issue of the
LSLs into two separate crises: on the one hand, an immediate danger posed to the public, to be
managed in the short term; on the other hand a larger, more complex crisis, for which
comprehensive solutions must be sought. If interim solutions are successful in managing the
short-term crisis, any immediate risk posed to residents will be minimized or eliminated.
Paradoxically, a successfully-managed crisis — for as long as residents are willing to partake in
short-term measures — alleviates some of the urgency for politicians to devise longer-term, more
expensive and politically arduous solutions. Miranda maintains that FLAC’s mission has been
clear from the outset: “Remove the lead pipes, there is no other alternative to eradicating lead in
water, it’s just to remove the lead pipes. And that’s our purpose, is to push the government to
prioritize, to send resources towards removing lead pipes” (R. Miranda, phone interview). If the
crisis is being effectively managed in the short term, mitigating — for those residents who can
afford these measures — any risk of lead poisoning, what impetus remains to compel
government to search for a long-term fix to remove any potential source of lead exposure?
Even some of FLAC’s organizers seem to recognize these as two separate crises: one to
be managed in the short-term, and one that demands comprehensive government action. In an
interview, one FLAC organizer mentioned that being able to afford a filter relieved him of any
immediate fears about the public health crisis: “for some people like me, I don't have kids, I can
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afford a filter, I can handle all that...as far as like, a personal risk to my health, right now I don't
feel it is. [...] Like I already said, I can take care of the health risk on my own” (FLAC organizer,
personal interview). In this calculus, providing residents with interim solutions effectively
bisects their prognostic frames into one set of immediate actions for residents’ protections, and a
separate set of long-term actions for government. This duality further undermines a framing
which holds government solely responsible, given that the majority of interim solutions —
flushing, childhood testing, filtering (both the distribution and purchasing subsequent cartridge
replacements) — will be undertaken by residents, health care providers and local organizations.
Further, these ‘interim solutions’ may turn out to be anything but interim, if — as Ordinance
160742 suggests — full remediation may take upwards of 30 years. If interim solutions prove
capable of reducing the health risks to acceptable levels for another three decades, FLAC may
find itself demanding that the government respond to a public health crisis which no longer
exists.

Reading Survey Data: Perceptions of Responsibility and Stop-gap Strategies
This tension between short-term and long-term solutions is already evident in the way
many residents understand the issue of LSLs, as can be seen in analysis of a survey conducted by
16th Street Community Health Centers (SSCHC) at two 2018 lead education events. The data
from these surveys reveals that while residents hold government primarily responsible, aligning
with FLAC’s demands for full remediation, residents are more likely to emphasize the
importance of short-term strategies to mitigate the effects of lead, rather than remove the risk
entirely. The rank ordered survey was distributed as residents arrived at each event, and asked
respondents to rank a list of possible remediation strategies (Figure 8), and the groups who had
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Question: In your opinion, which of these groups have the most responsibility in addressing lead poisoning?
Please rank (1 to 5) in order of importance, with 1 being the most important, and 5 the least important. Results
below reflect pre- and post-event survey responses.
Property Owners

Government

Organizations

Parents

Health Providers

POST (n=34)

PRE (n=34)
Figure 7 — 16th Street Survey Responses (Responsibility)
Data Source: 16th Street Community Health Center

the most responsibility in addressing lead poisoning (Figure 7). The survey was re-administered
at the conclusion of the session, after residents had heard from a number of health professionals,
city representatives and lead abatement specialists, to see if the information provided had
changed residents’ perceptions. Although the sessions did not reveal a notable shift in
respondents rankings (n=34), it did demonstrate that residents overwhelmingly held government
responsible for addressing lead poisoning: 56.8% of respondents ranked government number 1 in
pre-surveys, and 52.9% ranked government number 1 in post-surveys (Figure 7).
Respondents did not demonstrate a similar uniformity in their rankings for strategies,
which showed residents to be far more divided — no single strategy garnered more than 39% of
first place rankings (Figure 8). Further, the rankings for strategies were incongruous with
FLAC’s prognostic framing of full removal of the lead laterals, in that the strategies which
received the most votes were mitigation strategies, designed to deal with mediating existing lead
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Question: In your opinion, which of the following strategies is the most important to focus on to address lead
poisoning? Please rank (1 to 7) in order of importance, with 1 being the most important, and 7 the least
important. Results below reflect pre- and post-event survey responses.
Lead lateral
replacement

Education
opportunities

Childhood lead
testing

Water filter
distribution

Lead paint
abatement

Soil & landscape
improvements

Soil lead
testing

POST (n=24)

PRE (n=24)
Figure 8 — 16th Street Survey Responses (Strategies)
Data Source: 16th Street Community Health Center

exposure, rather than strategies to remove the source of exposure. Lead education opportunities
was the highest ranked strategy (27.8% ranked first pre-survey, 38.7% in post), with the
remaining responses split amongst water filter distribution (25% pre, 26.7% post), lead paint
abatement (8.3% pre, 6.5% post) and childhood lead testing, which saw the largest jump (8.3%
pre, 19.4% post). Together, filter distribution, education opportunities and childhood lead
testing garnered more than 70% of first place ranking in post- surveys. All of these can be
considered to represent pragmatic mitigation strategies — a recognition that lead exposure is
unavoidable, but that its most hazardous effects can be contained through a variety of measures.
The only two strategies listed which would wholly eliminate the possibility of lead exposure,
lead lateral replacement and lead paint abatement, received a total of 35.8% of first place
rankings in the pre- surveys, but fell to 26.7% in post-surveys. Lead lateral replacement alone
failed to garner more than 25% of first place rankings pre-survey, and fell to only 19.4% in post79

survey responses. While it is not surprising that residents might prioritize strategies which give
them an immediate measure of control over their lead exposure, this carries serious implications
for FLAC’s organizing efforts and their ability to leverage community activism to pressure
government into pursuing full removal of Milwaukee’s LSLs.
If these survey responses suggest that Milwaukeeans are willing to accept interim
solutions or personally undertake the necessary steps to mitigate the risks of lead poisoning,
there is similarly pressure for organizers to pursue a strategy focused on interim measures rather
than full remediation. These divergent strategies are already underway, as a leader of one of
FLAC’s partner organizations explained:
I have tremendous respect for Robert [Miranda] and all the work that they’ve
[FLAC] been doing on this issue, because without ‘em people wouldn’t be
thinking about doing anything about it. He and I may disagree whether first
priority is removing the lead pipes or just filtering and getting a public campaign
out there so that people understand the risks, make the decisions, start filtering.
(Director of FLAC partner organization, phone interview)
As emphasized in the quote above, alternative strategies to FLAC’s campaign of full remediation
are contingent upon residents actively assuming greater responsibility, acting in their own best
interests and making decisions to pursue interim solutions. In spite of how this devolved
responsibility runs contrary to FLAC’s framings, organizers recognize that “getting filters on
people's faucets is important….it's not a casual stopgap measure, it's an important stopgap
measure” (Local organizer, personal interview). These interim measures provide residents a
critical measure of autonomy over their own well-being, and a recourse to solutions in the
deafening absence of comprehensive government action. The same organizer quoted above
pragmatically noted “I mean logistically, can we just tear up every street and rip all the pipes out
in two years? No. So that means that we better have a pretty good long-term plan for water
filtration until then” (Local organizer, personal interview). Both residents and organizers
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understand that, as things currently stand, even the most aggressive municipal response would
place full remediation an unacceptable number of years in the distance, perhaps necessitating that
these “stopgap” measures serve as long-term — possibly lifetime — solutions.
If a comprehensive solution is indeed decades away, interim solutions are critical
measures by which residents may protect themselves from risk, a reality for which FLAC’s
framing must adapt. Pragmatism therefore necessitates that FLAC pursue a prognostic framing
that bifurcates solutions and responsibility, demanding both full removal of the laterals and an
increased emphasis on interim measures. However, a bifurcated notion of responsibility —
divided between ultimate responsibility for a long-term solution and interim responsibility for
necessary, stop-gap measures — has important implications for FLAC’s organizing strategy and
demands. The group has adjusted their demands to account for these interim measures, but is
loath to budge on their diagnostic framings of ultimate responsibility:
Demand: for the City to develop a comprehensive plan for lead removal and
mitigation (pipes and paint). This plan must not burden home owners [sic] and
renters with implementation costs, it must continually provide water filters to
affected residences, and must include the complete removal of all lead laterals in
the City within a generation (FLAC Community Assembly Agenda, April 2018).
Although FLAC may have amended their official demands, an uneasy relationship exists
between these two prognostic framings, in that interim measures such as filtering and education
programs may lessen the political pressure on city government by dint of their very
effectiveness.
Although organizers may agree that interim measures are necessary for public health,
demands for short term solutions may allow Milwaukee's elected officials latitude in continuing
to evade the question of complicated, expensive long-term solutions. While short-term measures
may reduce the likelihood of lead poisoning for some residents, it can never fully remove the
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risk. As one organizer put it, “you drag out the water filter and say a water filter is going to take
100% of the lead out of the water— there’s not a water filter manufactured by man! They’re
[government] using that as a band aid but they're not continuing to talk about removing these
pipes” (FLAC organizer, personal interview). Not only do these solutions place responsibility on
residents instead of government, where FLAC contends it ultimately rests, they pose a problem
for FLAC’s mission of full removal of the lead laterals because they are interim measures
focused on minimizing risk, rather than removing it. If interim measures are able to effectively
manage the crisis by mitigating immediate risks for Milwaukee residents for decades to come,
they may have the perverse effect of undermining FLAC’s political opportunity by removing any
immediate public health crisis, relieving the pressure on government to pursue comprehensive,
long-term solutions.
In spite of the neoliberal context within which residents are willing to assume greater
responsibility, this study does not contend that the individuated risk and increased emphasis on
short-term solutions is solely the result of government neglect or a neoliberal governmentality;
rather, I argue that we must take seriously the role of lead itself in frustrating FLAC’s ultimate
prognostic framings, and in facilitating the ease with which residents will either accept
responsibility for interim measure or do without any sort of comprehensive solution. Therefore,
the next section explores more fully the unique properties of Milwaukee’s lead laterals.

5.5 The invisibility of lead
As this research has attempted to demonstrate, much of FLAC’s work has been devoted
to persuading Milwaukeeans and their elected officials that LSLs pose a compelling and
galvanizing public health risk. This begs the question, is there something about lead which
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makes it uniquely difficult to organize around? Or, more specifically, is there something about
Milwaukee’s urban lead — positioned within networks of space, race, politics and non-humans
— which makes it uniquely difficult to organize around, and irreconcilably different from other
urban lead environmental justice movements? Although the recent horrors of Flint’s urban lead
crisis have at times served as part of FLAC’s motivational framing, colloquially invoked by
activists as a similar and galvanizing example of lead poisoning and racialized, political
callousness, this chapter argues that Milwaukee’s case of urban lead is distinct from Flint. When
we expand our analysis, in the vein of Actor Network Theory (ANT) to consider the relational
networks of power and agency, we can consider not only the uniqueness of lead and the
challenges it poses for organizers, but the unique ways in which the networks of which
Milwaukee’s urban lead are a part have conditioned and hampered the efforts of FLAC and other
activists. The “actor network” at issue in Milwaukee includes the spatiality of the pipes, the
history of their development, the racialized and segregated landscape of the city, and numerous
other ‘actants’ that together distinguish the lead in Milwaukee’s pipes, making its visibility more
contested, more challenging and more complex.
The crisis to which FLAC has devoted itself is, for a variety of reasons, ‘invisible’; it is
largely unseen not only in public discourse or media coverage but in the sense that the lead
laterals and the risks associated with them are difficult — geographically, temporally, materially
and physically — to locate. In spite of this ‘invisible’ crisis, FLAC has successfully agitated for
overt government acknowledgement of the issue, greater distribution of information to the
public, and tangible (if meagre) municipal responses to FLAC’s prognostic framing. However,
the group has still struggled to garner a sufficient collective response from residents with their
motivational framing. If the purpose of diagnostic and motivational framing in social
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movements is to generate collective action and mobilize those affected, we might see this modest
public response as one example of how an ‘invisible’ crisis might affect public perception of
these framings, making the issue easy for residents to ignore and for elected officials to deny.
Therefore, I suggest that the uneven public response to FLAC’s organizing efforts cannot be
sufficiently explained solely through frame analysis; rather, I contend that we must take seriously
the role of non-humans in shaping perceptions of the embodied risks attached to the LSLs, and
who then ultimately bears responsibility for their remediation. Lead is more than simply the
subject at hand; it plays an agential and significant role in shaping (and inhibiting) framings,
perceptions, and actions, often because its presence — in the ground, the water, and the body —
is so difficult to prove.
The most unambiguous way in which Milwaukee’s lead crisis is invisible is that the water
is objectively inconspicuous. Unlike the lead crisis in Flint, MI, Milwaukee’s water does not
appear perceptibly dangerous; it neither tastes, smells nor looks ‘dangerous,’ and because there is
no instigating public health event for current crisis, Milwaukee residents have not seen their
water quality change. In Robert Miranda’s eyes, this is what makes Milwaukee water “more
insidious” than Flint, a threat that communicates, by dint of its invisibility, a false sense of
security to residents (R. Miranda, phone interview). This hurdle of perception is a high bar for
FLAC and other organizers, who must provide a diagnostic and motivational framing compelling
enough to cause residents to examine an habitual action — turning on their tap — as dangerous,
in spite of a lack of discernable evidence that doing so poses an imminent risk. A FLAC
member who runs a local non-profit health organization likened this to the education efforts
around the AIDS crisis in the 1980s, where risk was ambiguous and the solutions required a
fundamental change in everyone’s personal, sexual behaviors:
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People had to change, completely change their behaviors around sex in order to
stay safe, and you didn’t even want to get the test because you were afraid to find
out, because you knew you had done things that were risky. So I think it’s a lot
like that, because I can say to people ‘go get tested’ but I would be willing to bet
that I have not have not been able to convince one fucking person to get tested
(Director of FLAC partner organization, phone interview).
While it the inconspicuous nature of Milwaukee’s water may be a significant obstacle for
organizers to overcome in persuading residents to change their everyday behaviors, it is also
important to note that due to the differentiation housing stock in the city, not all Milwaukeeans
expect their water to seem ‘safe’ and perpetually drinkable, even before revelations of the
widespread LSLs. The same interviewee noted that “depending upon where you live in the city
of Milwaukee, you turn your water on and it may come out discolored” (Director of FLAC
partner organization, phone interview). And yet, it is illuminating to set this reality alongside the
responses of those Milwaukeeans who do unquestioningly see their water supply as drinkable
and harmless; the above quote was immediately followed with an anecdote about her daughter:
My daughter lives over on the East side, off of Brady, and um, she was washing
her dishes one day, and she’s got a set of white dishes, and she said the water was
yellow. So she ran a glass of the water and then went in her bathroom and the
water there came out clear. And she put the two glasses side by side, and said
what the hell is—she took a picture and texted me—she said ‘what the hell is
going on’? And I said ‘what the hell is going on is I just ordered you a water filter
off of Amazon and it will be delivered tomorrow (Director of FLAC partner
organization, phone interview).
This complex negotiation of the differentiated pattern of risk in the city of Milwaukee seems to
imply that while not all residents have access to have objectively safe, drinkable water, some
residents should — or at the very least, have come to expect that they should. For certain
residents, turning on the tap to find discolored water serves as enough of a shock to drive an
immediate response to mediate potential risk; for other residents in the city, discolored water is
simply what they have come to expect when they turn on the tap, meaning for these residents,
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any potential ‘riskiness’ due to lead is disguised by the fact that normal water already appears
risky.
Not only is the crisis ‘invisible’ in that LSLs are subterranean, but confirmation of the
spatial extent of the LSLs is hidden in the history of Milwaukee’s infrastructural development.
In order to determine the spatial extent of the LSL crisis, the city has relied upon the year each
house was built as evidence of risk, based on the presumption that certain materials were used
during specific years of development. Because water systems are a network of city-owned
service lines combined with property-owned lines, identification of risk is contingent upon
identifying both city- and property-side materials. However, verifying these materials requires a
laborious examination of the uneven and uncertain records kept over decades of unsupervised
private-side development. Former MWW Commissioner Carrie Lewis explained:
What [material] is on the private side is not recorded anywhere. What’s on the
private side may be recorded, I am told by plumbing inspection, as a little note on
the permit when the inspector went to inspect the installation in the house, but that
isn’t catalogued, that isn’t collected and searchable except on those individual
pieces of paper (Water Quality Task Force Meeting, February 10, 2017).
Given the unevenness of such record keeping, LSLs — particularly those laid on the private-side
between 1951 and 1962 — pose a doubly invisible risk to the residents of these homes. These
laterals are not only invisible in that they are buried in the ground, but because proof of the risk
is oftentimes non-existent in official records, meaning their ‘riskiness’ might go uncounted by
official city maps and estimates.
Currently, official city maps (Figure 2) and listings of ‘at-risk’ properties are based on
records of homes built prior to 1962, the year in which the City of Milwaukee mandated the
exclusive use of copper pipes for service lines. However, previous estimates of risk — including
the 70,000 residences that had received the initial letter from MWW — had relied on the
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assumption that lead pipes had not been used after 1951. This amendment, changing the
dividing line between safety and danger from 1951 to 1962, added an additional 12,000 potential
homes to the pool of at-risk residences, immediately rendering previously innocuous homes sites
of risk. Even with this amendment, there continues to be ambiguity in which homes are affected;
the City routinely used lead for service lines prior to 1951, but did not officially mandate the use
of copper until 1962, making the additional 12,000 homes precarious zones of risk and safety,
with only one way to definitively reveal if the possible threat is real: to locate the pipe and
examine it. This physical and temporal invisibility further contributes to the sense that the lead
laterals are a spectral crisis: a potentially widespread crisis that eludes official methods of
identification. To mediate this unknowability of the geographic distribution of risk, both FLAC
and the City of Milwaukee have made efforts to help residents verify the risk on their own, by
testing to see if their pipes are indeed made of lead (Figure 10).

Figure 9 — “Test a service line to see if it is made of lead”
Source: City of Milwaukee

Confirming that a service line is made from lead only constitutes part of the calculation
of risk, which is tied not only to the presence of LSLs but also to the unpredictable way they
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affect the toxicity of water as it moves through the laterals, a further ‘invisibility’ of the risk
associated with LSLs. Although testing may indeed reveal elevated lead levels, the toxicity is
prone to fluctuate, spiking as lead particles flake off the pipes into the moving water and at times
dwindling to ‘risk-free’ levels. Risk here is not just invisible but unpredictable, subsiding and
reemerging in an unpredictable fashion that may defy a definitive scientific classification as
either at-risk or risk-free. When one activist found out their lead blood level was 17 bbp, they
did everything possible to uncover the source of lead exposure; because this activist lived in a
home with LSLs and did not have any other ‘risky’ behaviors, process of elimination seemed to
guarantee that risk exposure must have come from the taps. As Miranda put it, “[she] doesn't eat
paint chips, she doesn't eat mud pies 1 and she isn't out snorting windowsill dust. The only way
she got that, and she knows it, is she drank water from her lead line tap at her home” (R.
Miranda, phone interview). And yet, testing the taps proved to be infuriatingly inconclusive:
We tested the water in my master [bedroom] sink and it was higher than at my
kitchen sink, but that means nothing because you know, the test is only good for
that minute. You know, you test two hours later and get a different test result, two
weeks later and have different test results. The thing I learned about testing water
is don’t do it. Stop testing your water and just buy the filter. (Director of FLAC
partner organization, phone interview).
This frustration demonstrates that testing, purportedly a means to identifying risk, can in fact
serve to highlight the unknowability of lead, even when risk has been otherwise proven to be
demonstrably evident in one’s body, as it was for this FLAC member. Although process of
elimination seemed to imply that the exposure had to have come from the taps, the uneven
toxicity results did little more to confirm or refute the riskiness of the activists LSLs. This
ambiguity further contributes to a conditional sense of the riskiness of lead that organizers must
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The “mud pies” reference here is to possible exposure via lead in the soil, which is most accessible for children
who are crawling or playing outside and may ingest soil.
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overcome; the risk is at once spectral and threatening, while not yet discernable enough to drive
behavior changes or activism.
Further, because water in each municipality has a unique chemical composition, testing
for lead and the subsequent interpretation of the test results is both a proprietary action and
proprietary knowledge which cannot be personally undertaken by residents. Water testing must
be specifically calibrated in laboratories to refer to the characteristics of the sampled water,
requiring residents to either purchase testing kits which may then be sent off for calibration and
testing, or actively seek out the help of city agencies. While these at-home kits are relatively
affordable and widely available at most home goods stores, none of them are certified by the
EPA or any other government agency; by contrast, those laboratories that are EPA-certified
routinely work exclusively with businesses or city agencies, and will decline to provide testing
for individual homeowners. Municipal agencies such as MWW, on the other hand, have not
made testing widely available, and they will decline test water samples that are brought to their
offices by residents, for the specific reasons considered above: the risk changes from minute to
minute, and samples must be verified at the source. Unsurprisingly, residents at one SSCHC
lead education event repeatedly asked for information on how they could get themselves and
their water tested for lead. In spite of these hurdles, one activist seemed to imply that a failure to
understand how to test one’s water was due to a lack of personal motivation, explaining that “all
of that stuff [information about testing] is available easily on the internet if they’re [residents]
super curious….it’s just that people gotta make that decision that they want to be tested”
(Director of FLAC partner organization, phone interview). In this accounting, homeowners are
powerless to influence the chemical composition of their drinking water, are denied recourse to a
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means of independently ascertaining whether the water could indeed be considered ‘safe,’ and
are yet obligated to be personally responsible for finding a way to obtain that information.
Perhaps most sinister, given the spatial distribution of risk of Milwaukee’s lead laterals,
are the ‘invisible’ effects of long-term lead exposure in the body. The majority of scientific
research of lead exposure has focused on either the developmental effects of lead on pregnant
women and children under the age of six; studies of exposure in adults tend explore the effects of
high-dose, anomalous exposure, such as may be related to travel or workplace hazards.
Although lead bio-accumulates (remaining in the body and building up over time) long term,
low-dose exposure — such as might be caused by Milwaukee’s LSLs — has received much less
scientific attention. The studies that have explored the effects of lead poisoning in adults have
revealed that effects of long term, low-dose exposure may be ‘invisible’ in another sense, in that
they are easily conflated with the effects of genetics, poverty, and what might be pejoratively
referred to as “lifestyle choices.” Recent tests have revealed that even low-level lead exposure
can lead to high blood pressure, stroke and cardiovascular disease for adults (Lanphear et al.
2018, Navas-Acien et al. 2007), health outcomes which are more often considered to be the
unlucky result of genetics, lack of exercise and poor diet. Lead exposure can also cause
irritability, and affect decision-making ability and intelligence, effects which are more readily
considered individual character traits than health outcomes (CDC, 2017).
Further, lead exposure can be compounded by the effects of diet; an EPA publication
notes that “children with empty stomachs absorb more lead than children with full stomachs”
(EPA, 2001), a reality which disproportionately affects families living in poverty. Hunger and
poverty are inextricably linked, and there is a clear correlation to be made between one’s
physical ability to mitigate the effects of lead poisoning and one’s socioeconomic status, a
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connection we should not overlook, given the way poverty and segregation is tied to the spatial
distribution of risks posed by LSLs in Milwaukee. This potential invisibility — the insidious
connection between the long-term effects of lead poisoning and disenfranchised communities, is
one that is almost too immense to comprehend:
As more and more of this stuff comes out, more and more it shows that
communities that are poor, especially communities of color, that their kids are
being poisoned by this. I mean, it was back in the 1990s that they knew lead
caused violent behavior and disturbed behavior and…you know, poor ability to
get through school, but you just think the narrative is that it’s “these people” or
“poor people,” you just shrug your shoulders. ….Let’s look at what we’ve
wrought over these last 30, 40 years, of not paying attention to this. (Community
advocate, phone interview).
This is the magnitude of what FLAC — and Milwaukee — might be truly be reckoning with: the
invisible effects of lead on generations of certain communities, effects that have been racialized
and dismissed as “these people,” to use this community advocate’s words. Taken this way, we
must perhaps reconsider whether FLAC is indeed organizing ‘in the absence of a crisis,’ or if it is
more apt to argue that they are organizing around a crisis so difficult to detect, so latent, and so
oft dismissed that it has become not a crisis, but a chronic state.
•

•

•

As these findings have attempted to demonstrate, FLAC’s struggles to bring the LSL
crisis onto the public and political radar is hampered not only by a lack of political will and
government misdirection, but also by the very nature of the crisis. Lead itself, and its uneven
and invisible effects upon both bodies and space, has contributed significantly to the organizing
hurdles the group faces. These hurdles are compounded by residents’ willingness to assume
responsibility for pursuing and maintaining interim solutions, reducing the risk to acceptable
levels and reliving political pressure for expensive government solutions. However, these
interim measures protect only those Milwaukeeans who can afford interim solutions, potentially
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leaving residents who are already most at-risk for lead exposure doubly underserved — unable to
access interim solutions, and easily dismissed by a government that sees the crisis as effectively
managed. These findings not only carry practical implications for future activists’ efforts and
practices, but also for future research into local social movements.
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6 - CONCLUSION
This research expands social-movement and framing theories to understand the dynamics
between framings and non-humans, and the implications for the effectiveness of social
movement efforts. It does so by exploring not only the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational
frames employed by a local social movement, but also by examining the external factors that
have inhibited or conditioned the effects of these frames. The ideal combined effect of
diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framings is to mobilize activism in service of proposed
solutions for the identified problem; this interconnected nature means that external factors will
not simply affect one element of a social movement’s framing, but will have implications for
each discursive element and for the overall efficacy of the movement’s goals. This analysis
demonstrates how the effects of external factors — specifically, the often invisible role of nonhumans — can in fact be fundamental to a local social movement’s efforts to address urban lead
contamination.
This brings us full circle back to the question I posed of my own behavior at the outset —
what, exactly, facilitates such a complex and uneasy relationship with my lead laterals? The
conclusion seems to be that a variety of factors together contribute to a sense of unknowability of
risk and responsibility, to which social movement actors have sought to respond with clarity.
The limited publicly available information on the crisis, the repeated refutations by elected
officials and the City’s experience with lead abatement and water technology has contributed to
public confusion or denial as to the extent of the crisis, or ignorance of its very existence
(sections 5.1, 5.2). The uneven effects of place, race and political opportunity throughout
Milwaukee’s neighborhoods have made the risks of lead exposure ‘invisible’ — both by dint of
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the unintentionally mitigating effects of wealth and Whiteness, and because the effects of lead
exposure are easily conflated with the effects of poverty and segregation (section 5.3).
Municipal responses to the crisis have been insufficient to the magnitude of its effects, and have
emphasized individual responsibility over government-led solutions, which has the effect of
further penalizing those residents who are most afflicted by lead exposure, and unable to afford
interim solutions (section 5.4). Lastly, lead itself contributes greatly to this uneasy and uneven
relationship — ‘invisible’ in many ways, lead has proven a uniquely difficult contaminant
around which to organize a social movement (section 5.5).
FLAC has gone to great lengths to account for the unknowability of lead, and the
unevenness of its effects in Milwaukee's water supply. This can be seen in the group’s efforts to
reveal the science behind lead’s ‘invisible’ embodied effects, and their determined emphasis on
the uneven relationship between race, poverty, and lead poisoning, which disproportionately
affects certain neighborhoods for reasons that are insufficiently addressed by existing efforts to
remediate lead risks. Although the group is many ways cognizant of the dynamics of nonhumans, they have yet primarily employed framings that emphasize the social and political
conditions that have made current patterns of lead exposure problematic. While these dynamics
are critical to the current case study, alternative frames that more directly engaged with the
unique characteristics of lead would certainly be possible, and would not prohibit an emphasis on
socio-political factors. For example, a framing which emphasized the unknowability of lead
— the ‘invisible’ threat in 70,000 homes — would not preclude a framing of government
malfeasance. Rather, such a framing would benefit from illuminating the ways in which
government action has unevenly distributed this ‘invisible’ threat, exacerbating its effects and its
unknowability for certain areas of the city. This study therefore carries practical implications for
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local social movement and activist practice. By revealing the dynamics of non-humans in the
current case study, it is my hope that subsequent framings can not only take seriously the role of
non-humans, but also discursively relate and respond to the conditions they produce.
Recognizing the role of non-humans in social movements offers an important opportunity
for future research to analyze how framings have — and have not — managed to take seriously
the role of non-humans in shaping or constraining collective-action frames. Following this
study’s findings, future research might help to reveal if an explicit recognition of the properties
and capabilities of non-humans leads to more nuanced — and successful — collective-action
frames. Using Milwaukee’s local social movement efforts to remediate lead laterals as a case
study, this research demonstrates that there may be significant theoretical and practical insights
to be gleaned from recognizing the role of non-humans in framing activity.
This study also has practical implications for policy, as it demonstrates that the trend in
Milwaukee towards short-term solutions and mitigation strategies places an undue burden on
residents and alleviates political pressure for long-term solutions to remove all of the city’s lead
service lines. FLAC’s focus has always been on full removal of all of the city’s lead laterals, at
no cost to homeowners; although their framings have adapted to include demands for interim
measures, as well, it remains to be seen how the group will continue to generate public interest
and political will to pursue expensive and complex solutions for a crisis that, while still existing
in 70,000 homes, has been — for some residents — effectively reduced to a manageable, ‘riskfree’ level.
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8 - APPENDICES
Appendix A - Milwaukee Water Works letter to LSL property owners
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Appendix B – List of interview participants
Name (if applicable) and occupation / affiliation
Robert Miranda, Founder of FLAC
FLAC partner/organizer

Interview Type
Phone interview, In-person
interview
In-person interview

Director of FLAC partner organization

Phone interview

Community Advocate

Phone interview

Milwaukee Budget Specialist

Phone interview

Milwaukee Fiscal Planning Specialist

Phone interview

Community organizer, FLAC partner organization

In-person interview

FLAC activist

In-person interview

FLAC activist

In-person interview
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Appendix C – List of interview questions
•

When did you first find out about Milwaukee’s lead laterals?

•

How did you find out about Milwaukee’s lead laterals?

•

What do you know about where Milwaukee’s lead laterals are located?

•

Is your home / neighborhood impacted by Milwaukee’s lead laterals?

•

Do you know if your home is one of the addresses with potential lead laterals?

•

What do you understand to be the risks posed by the lead laterals?

•

In your opinion, for whom do the lead laterals pose the greatest risk?

•

What actions, if any, have you taken in your own life to minimize the risks (as you
understand them)?

•

What actions, if any, do you plan to take in the future to minimize the risks (as you
understand them)?

•

How have you decided which actions to take to minimize the risks?

•

What actions have you seen the city undertake to minimize the risks posed by the lead
laterals?

•

What further actions do you believe the city should take?

•

What is your relationship to FLAC (the Freshwater for Life Action Coalition)?

•

Are you involved in any of FLAC’s efforts? If so, how? If not, why?

•

What do you understand to be FLAC’s mission?

•

Do you agree with FLAC’s mission? If not, why not? If not entirely, in what ways?

•

What actions have been undertaken by FLAC to minimize the risks posed by the lead
laterals?

•

What further actions do you expect them to take?

•

In your opinion, are certain Milwaukeeans more involved than others in this social
movement? If so, who?

•

In your opinion, what drives Milwaukeeans to be more / less involved in this movement?
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